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1. Introduction 
 
The mountainous country of Tajikistan in Central Asia has only 6% of arable land. 
This land however is crucial for the survival of the people, especially after the 
economic breakdown following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent 
civil war. The agricultural use of this scarce land is for more than 80% only possible 
with irrigation. Although the country is rich in water resources, inefficient usage leads 
to water shortages. In quantitative terms, 85% of water use in Tajikistan is devoted to 
irrigation agriculture (UNECE 2004: 137). Identifying shortcomings in irrigation 
management and reforming it towards efficient and sustainable systems is hence one 
priority in the general reform of water resources management.  
 
1.1 Problem statement 
Tajikistan, like many other countries, follows a reform approach towards participatory 
irrigation management (PIM). The reform in Tajikistan transfers the responsibility of 
the secondary channels (on-farm channels1) to Water User Associations (WUAs) that 
are expected to be responsible for the operation and maintenance of these systems, 
for the collection of water charges, for equitable water distribution and conflict 
resolution. There has been considerable research on this subject worldwide that has 
disproved that once WUAs are established they would result in efficient and equitable 
water management, although this still presents a predominant assumption (Mott 
MacDonald, DFID 2005:S-1; Narain 2004). 
This paper builds on the premise that WUA performance is closely interrelated with 
institutional and political aspects of the water sector and the societal environment in 
general and that one reason for the failure of many PIM reforms is that these aspects 
have been neglected by practitioners and academics. In their seminal book on the 
politics of irrigation reform, Mollinga and Bolding state that “the word ‘politics’ is 
virtually absent in formal policy discourse on irrigation reform” (Mollinga, Bolding 
2004:4). This is ascribed to the perception that irrigation would be a merely technical 
                                            
1 The term ‘on-farm channels’ refers to the channels on the territory of the former kolkhozes or 
sovkhozes, for which these have been responsible, in contrast to off-farm channels, which are 
state-managed. While these terms are still in use, it would be more precise today to distinguish 
between main (state-managed), secondary (between today’s farms) and tertiary (inside farms) 
channels. 
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system based on rational decision-making and implementation by experts (engineers 
and ‘hydrocrats’). The aim of this paper is to make a contribution to the emerging 
discussion on the political nature of irrigation management and especially irrigation 
management reform via a case study of Tajikistan. It also aims to contribute to a 
better understanding of the problems and challenges of the irrigation reform 
processes in Tajikistan.  
Politics is for the purpose of this study defined in its relation to natural resource use 
as by Kerkvliet (1990:11; quoted in Mollinga, Bolding 2004:6):  
“…the debates, conflicts, decisions, and cooperation among individuals, groups, and 
organizations regarding the control, allocation, and use of resources and the values 
and ideas underlying these activities”.  
 
In this sense, politics refers to the process of policy-making – who’s ideas and values 
are represented in policy decisions – as well as the process of policy implementation 
– who actually decides and who in which way influences implementation and 
compliance of these decisions. An analysis of the institutional and political factors in 
irrigation reform involves an investigation of the actors: Who are the relevant actors 
that pursue decisions for reform? Who is responsible for implementing these policy 
decisions? Who is actually implementing them and who is not? Special attention was 
drawn to the role of local institutions concerning implementation. Institutions are 
understood as formal and informal rules – societally accepted ways of behavior, such 
as laws, traditions, norms, and values, which can be embodied in organizations. It 
also refers to the cognitive systems underlying those rules. Informal societal rules 
can comply with or undermine state rules.  
The paper will show that institutional change in water management is rather a 
complex process of ‘institutional bricolage’ (Cleaver 2002, Galvan 2004) than the 
simple displacement of one institutional arrangement by another. Institutional 
bricolage describes a non-determined movement albeit the choice is limited by the 
elements available. It emphasizes the unspecific character of the process of 
institutional change in which institutions are ‘put together’ by the bricoleurs puttering 
and using pre-existing institutional elements already available and perceived as 
useful. In the process of designing institutions, the bricoleurs can patch together 
elements of different institutional logics available to them. Bricolage offers therefore 
an approach of institutional change that lies between path dependency and the 
development of new, alternative paths that are certainly never completely “new” but a 
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re-combination of existing institutional elements and new concepts. Additionally, the 
concept allows analyzing not only the constraining aspects of institutions but also the 
creative potential of actors. 
Another main argument of the paper is that the strong involvement of donor agencies 
at different stages of the policy process has a strong impact on the lack of ownership 
and the implementation of reform policies and has even counterproductive effects on 
state reform capacities.  
 
1.2 Methodology 
Most of the data for the study was gathered during two field research visits in 
August/September 2004 and September/October 2005 respectively. The main 
methods have been semi-structured and open expert interviews with representatives 
of the different agencies of the state water and land administration as well as of 
donor agencies. For reasons of confidentiality, all interviewees remain anonymous. 
Apart from state agencies, interviews and/or field visits were conducted at the 
following organizations: ACTED, GAA, Mercy Corps, UNDP, World Bank, as well as 
at the local NGOs ASTI,  ADSP NAU, and Nature Protection Team. A list of all 
interviews and the assigned codes can be found at the end of the paper.2 
To complement these interviews, a case study of one Water User Association was 
also conducted. The main objective of the detailed case study was to get a deeper 
insight into local institutional arrangements and how they affect water management. 
The village for the case study was not selected on criteria of representativeness as 
the objective of the case study is not to confirm or falsify certain hypotheses but 
rather to heuristically develop an understanding of the institutional dynamics on local 
level. Aini Rayon was chosen due to the willingness and interest of the regional 
project office of the German NGO German Agro Action (GAA) to support such a 
study. The village, Iskodar, was selected together with GAA staff. In 2004, this village 
was also in a sample of four villages researched for a GAA-study on local decision-
making processes (Grundmann 2004). This study not only provided basic data on the 
village but also allowed for comparison (and confirmation) of the research findings. 
For this case study, PRA tools such as observations, semi-structured as well as open 
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interviews, and group discussions were employed. Interviews were conducted with 
representatives of the WUA and other local organizations as well as with twelve 
randomly selected villagers. These were endorsed by interviews with representatives 
of the district water administration, of the district land committee and of the GAA. 
Group discussions were conducted with four members of the WUA council and a 
random group of female villagers. The research was conducted over one week 
together with a local research assistant. 
 
Figure 1: Map of Tajikistan with research areas 
 
 
Besides Aini, WUAs in Shakhriston, Kanibadam, Mastcha and Ganchi districts were 
visited and interviewed. Additionally, research was also conducted in the Farkhor 
district (Khatlon province) to compare the situation in places without reform activities.  
 
                                                                                                                                        
2  In references (e.g. t01:23), t01 is the code for the interview. The number after the colon indicates 
the paragraph in the interview transcript.  
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2. Context of the reform of local irrigation management 
2.1 Irrigation agriculture in Tajikistan 
Only 6% of Tajikistan’s territory is suitable for agriculture. The area of agricultural 
land – excluding pastures – is indicated as between 739,000 ha and 860,000 ha. 
719,000 ha of this (84%) is irrigated land. The overwhelming part of irrigated land 
(83%) lie in the Sughd and Khatlon oblasts (Bucknall et al 2003: 3; UNECE 2004: 
137; UNDP 2003: 20, 23,32). Due to Tajikistan’s geographic and topographic 
features, pumping irrigation plays an important role: According to different sources, 
between 290,000 and 350,000 ha are served by pump stations alone; considerably 
more receive partial water supply from pumps; in total over 60% depend at least 
partly on pumps (USAID n.d:1; Bucknall et al. 2003: 27, UNDP 2003: 36). 
Irrigation agriculture was affected by the general economic decline following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent civil war. About 20 to 30% of the 
area is not used due to deteriorated infrastructure, unaffordable inputs for farmers 
and other reasons. Agricultural production has reduced since independence by 50% 
(Bucknall et al 2003: 4, UNECE 2004: 137). However, agriculture is still of vital 
economic importance: Cotton brings 11% of all export gains3. 65% of the workforce is 
engaged in agriculture (about one third more than in 1991). Subsistence agriculture 
has became increasingly important, especially for the three quarters of the population 
of Tajikistan who live in rural areas (UNDP 2003: 33f; UNECE 2004: 137). Cotton, 
which is especially water-intense, constitutes 43% of all planted crops is (UNDP 
2003: 38). Due to this concentration on cotton, there is a deficit in food production of 
about 20% (UNECE 2004: 138).  
 
2.2 Financial crisis of the water sector 
The main reason for denationalizing irrigation management world wide is the state 
budget crisis. This is also the case in Tajikistan. It inherited a highly centralized state-
run irrigation management system from the Soviet Union. The main state agency was 
and is the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Management (MIWM), with branches at 
province (Oblast) and district (Rayon) levels. All off-farm channels and pumping 
                                            
3  At 11% it is the third most important export commodity besides aluminum (61%) and electricity 
(12%). 
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stations are in their responsibility. Only the on-farm channels have been in the 
responsibility of the former kolkhozes and sovkhozes (FSK).  
 
Due to the electricity costs for the pumping stations, irrigation here is more expensive 
than in other Central Asian countries. Funding was initially entirely provided by the 
state. Water fees were only in 1996 (see chapter 3.1). The allotted financial means, 
however, declined by more than 90% - from 72 Mio. Dollar in 1991 to 6.5 Mio. Dollar 
in 2002 (UNDP 2003: 33). As a consequence, there was a dramatic decline of the 
state of infrastructure, which in turn resulted in almost 20% of the previously irrigated 
land not being cultivated. Though exact data is unavailable, MIWM estimated that 
about 50% of the irrigation systems and 65% of the pumping systems are in poor 
condition or are not functioning at all. Renovation costs are assessed at about 130 
Mio. Dollar, of which 22 Mio. Dollar goes to annual maintenance costs (UNDP 2003: 
55-57). This budget crisis was one reason why there was and still is a perceived 
need for reform.  
 
2.3 Land reform and its impact on irrigation management 
The second reason for the need for irrigation reform is the ongoing land reform. A 
detailed analysis and assessment of land reform is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, a  short outline is necessary to understand the resulting implications for 
irrigation management. 
Land reform started in 1992 with the main objective of converting the state and 
collective farms (sovkhozes and kolkhozes)4 into private farms. The basic principles 
are laid down in the 1992 law “On Land Reform”. This law envisioned the possibility 
of setting up independent Dekhan farms (DF) 5 without an exact definition of it 
though. 
All members of a former sovkhoz or kolkhoz have the right of a share of the land, 
including former workers who are now pensioners, soldiers or deputies in elected 
institutions. If the village assembly agrees, teachers and doctors living in the village 
will also get a share 
                                            
4  While a sovkhoz  was directly managed by the government, a kolkhoz  was managed by an 
elected administration, which however had to be approved by the local party committee and also 
had to follow state instructions. Both encompassed typically more than 1,000 ha. 
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In the aftermath of the civil war, the presidential decree No. 522 “On Restructuring 
Agricultural Enterprises and Organizations” (1996), the law “On Dekhan Farms”, 
revised in 2003, and other laws and decrees further specified restructuring methods 
and the new forms of farms. With regards to the equipment (including irrigation sets, 
processing fabrics, etc.) there are instructions in article 7 of annex 2 to the decree 
No. 522: The infrastructure of the FSK can be transferred to the respective state 
agencies: communication infrastructure to Telecom, cultural club to the Ministry of 
Culture, and power station to the Ministry of Energy.  Hence the irrigation system 
could get assigned to the MIWM. More information on this aspect will be delivered in 
chapter 5.1.3.   
According to the law, the land is still state property but the farmers have inheritable 
tenure rights and complete legal freedom of independent farm management. They 
are only obliged to pay taxes and to cultivate their land in an efficient and productive 
manner. Under certain circumstances, the state has the right to withdraw the tenure 
rights without compensation. All FSK should have been reorganized in Dekhan farms 
by December, 31st 2005 – a target that has get to be met. Exceptions exist for about 
170 state farms for seed production, livestock breeding, and research (AAH 2003:4). 
The principal government agency responsible for the implementation of the land 
reform is the State Land Committee. It has branches in all Oblasts and Rayons. The 
State Land Committee was established in 1996. While it was initially subordinated to 
the government, it has since 1998 acted as an independent commission (t43:24). 
 
As a result of land reform, there are now three types of agricultural enterprises (t47:2-
9; AAH 2003: 6f):  
1) Individual farm: consists of one family, the land certificate is registered under the 
head of family; 
2) Farmer’s farm (fermerskoe khozjajstvo): consists of several families, the land 
certificate is registered under the chair of the farm with the names of all members 
listed in the document. 
Both types are also often referred to as independent Dekhan farms. They are usually 
run by an individual, a family or a group of families. Both are formed by active 
application of the farmers and not by allotment. The individual(s) either apply to the 
                                                                                                                                        
5  Dekhan is the Tajik word for farmer. 
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farm administration and the Khukumat to withdraw their shares of a collective DF or 
they apply for land from the special fund6 (Art. 11, law “On Dekhan Farms”). These 
independent DFs are usually small with plots of less than 50 ha. One precondition to 
establish such an independent farm is that the farmers become pro-active. They also 
need to have access to information on their legal rights, besides to the financial 
means to pay the official and unofficial costs of registration - and often personal 
relations with the local authorities. 
3) Collective Dekhan farm (obshshestvennoe dekhkanskoe khozjajstvo): land 
certificate is registered under the farm’s name with names of all members listed in 
an annex.  
With this type, one FSK is reorganized into one (sometimes several) DF in a top-
down process. The chief of the FSK is “elected” chief of the DF. The land certificate is 
issued under the name of the farm with a list of all members in the annex. All 
members should receive membership certificates.7 These collective DF are managed 
in the same style of the kolkhozes before and the changes can be considered as only 
cosmetic (new name). In many cases, farmers themselves are unaware of the 
reorganization.8 
Meanwhile a fourth type of farm is evolving, namely the association of Dekhan farms. 
Increasingly, independent DFs unite to become associations with a single 
management responsible for buying the necessary inputs, providing machinery, etc., 
and therefore taking percentages of the profit (usually between 2% and 10%). The 
degree of autonomy of the member farms varies. In some cases, FSK have been 
transformed directly into associations of DFs, which might only exist on paper and 
function like the FSK before. 
According to the National Land Committee, by 10/01/2005, 26,608 Dekhan farms 
were registered, of which 8,609 were collective ones and 17,459 independent (family 
and individual) ones (t32:15).  
Besides the state budget crisis, this reorganization of land tenure has been the main 
stimulus for irrigation reform. As thousands of small farms came into existence, the 
                                            
6  The special fund distributes unused land of sovkhozes and kolkhozes. This land is typically of low 
quality. 
7  A survey by AAH of farmers in Khatlon found that only 5.6% of the interviewed collective 
Dekhanfarm  members got a membership certificate. AAH 2003: 6. 
8  In the mentioned AAH survey, 64.3% of all interviews household of Dekhan farm workers thought 
that they would still work at the FSK. 
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new situation was a challenge for water management in the irrigation sector. While 
before the kolkhozes and sovkhozes were responsible for water distribution on their 
huge areas and the maintenance of the on-farm canals, now the newly emerged 
small farms had to be supplied individually with water. As nobody felt responsible for 
the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the on-farm channels and due to the lack of 
financial means, investments in infrastructure maintenance almost stopped, irrigation 
systems deteriorated and water use was not controlled anymore. The new situation 
demanded new forms of management. 
 
 
3. Reforming local irrigation management 
3.1 Policies 
The first action to overcome the water sector’s financial crisis was the introduction of 
water tariffs for irrigation water delivery by a presidential decree in 1996. This 
irrigation service fee (ISF) is not for water as a resource but for the water delivery 
service. Water as a resource is still free of charge. Only those have to pay for 
irrigation water who receive it from the district water administration (Rayonnoe 
upravlenie vodnogo khozyaystvo, RVKh), i.e. who use water from channels or 
pumping stations served by them. Those who use water that is directly discharged 
from mountain springs or by self-owned groundwater pumps do not have to pay. 
The ISF was raised gradually and has been 1.2 Dirham9 per 1 m³ since August 2004 
(t12:19; t26:21). However, these fees are insufficient for full cost-recovery. The 
intention was rather to start with a symbolic fee to raise awareness that water is not 
an endless resource. However, water agencies are now expected to cover part of 
their costs through fee collection.  
 
In 2000, the old water code of 1993 was replaced by a new one. This code 
emphasizes economic mechanisms of water management and also provides some, 
albeit vague, instructions for irrigation reform.  § 43 codifies the right of the farmers to 
establish water user associations (WUAs) in order to manage on-farm irrigation 
systems, to distribute the water among the farmers, and to charge fees for water 
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delivery. The law does not enforce the establishment of WUAs, but only legalizes the 
possibility without specifying their status and without concrete mechanisms and by-
laws for implementing the article. It was later accomplished by a decree of the Prime 
Minister, which stated that after 2001, all on-farm irrigation systems should be 
transferred to WUAs (t12:20). 
After the programs to establish WUAs began (see subsequent chapter), it soon 
became obvious that article 43 of the Water Code was insufficient as a legal base for 
WUAs and that a separate law on WUAs was necessary. The financial aspects (e.g. 
tax liability, non-commercial status) especially required clarification. A special law 
defining the exact status and duties of these associations is not in place yet. A draft 
for such a law was prepared in the framework of the farm privatization project by the 
Center for Farm Privatization Support (CFPS) together with the MIWM (t19:40). The 
first draft was in circulation in 2003 (t12:20). The work is still ongoing, though it was 
reported that it would have been its final stage.  
Although there is a perceived strong need for reform, the policy itself remained rather 
vague and can be considered more as a framework legislature without concrete 
mechanisms and instructions for implementation. Despite these vague instructions, 
WUAs are the main instruments of implementing the financial (collection of water 
fees) as well as the institutional (new responsibilities for on-farm channels) aspects of 
irrigation reform. The implementation process will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
3.2 Implementation  
The plans and activities for water user associations started before their existence 
was foreseen by law. The first projects to establish Water User Associations (WUAs) 
in Tajikistan were started by the World Bank within the framework of the Farm 
Privatization Project (1999-2005) and the Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project 
(2000-2006) (t13:5; t14:3). Their primary objective is the development of the 
agricultural sector. One component is the rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure with 
WUAs as a sub-component. WUAs were established basically to care for the 
rehabilitated irrigation systems, which is done by grant. The implementation agency 
                                                                                                                                        
9  In 2000, a new currency was introduced: 1 Somoni = 100 Dirham. 1 Somoni is equivalent to 
€ 0.30. 
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is the especially established Center for Farm Privatization Support (CFPS) at the 
Ministry of Agriculture.  
The CFPS was established in 1999. In the project districts, executive centers (tsentr 
ispolnenija) were set up to support the creation and strengthening of WUAs, give 
administrative and technical support, and organize and control the rehabilitation 
works. The CFPS provides not only seminars and trainings, but also technical 
equipment like computers, motorcycles, office equipment, etc. (t02:02-12, 70; 
t04:08). The center cooperates with the MIWM and its agencies at Oblast and Rayon 
level. 
The World Bank project initially comprised 10 FSK: four in Khatlon, three in Sughd, 
three in the direct rule districts (DRD10). The scope was extended in the course of the 
project. The first WUA, the WUA “Mirob” (district Sharinov, DRD), was officially 
registered on December 25th, 2001. In October 2003, there were 28 WUAs working: 
10 in Sughd, 7 in DRD and 11 in Khatlon (t04:35-38). All are within the cotton areas 
(t12:04). WUAs are financially supported during the initial years: In the first year, 75% 
of the costs for salary are paid by the project, in the second year 50%, and in the 
third year 25%. By the fourth year, WUAs have to be fully self-financed (t04:08). ADB 
and USAID started similar projects.  
Besides the WUAs established by these top-down projects, there are also bottom-up 
projects at local level. Here it can be distinguished between two kinds of projects: 
First, those aimed solely at setting up WUAs. Second, projects that establish WUAs 
as part of wider focused community development (CD) programs. In those projects, 
irrigation water management is one mechanism to reach the general aim of 
community development, besides drinking water supply, health services, micro 
credits, and other issues. The establishment and legal registration of associations is 
part of the sustainability component of these projects. These projects are 
implemented mainly by international NGOs, although the UNDP has such programs 
as well. In contrast to the CFPS-project, these projects do not provide any credits or 
grants for salaries. They alsoprovide grants for the rehabilitation of the irrigation 
system as an incentive, but expect a certain amount of community contribution to the 
costs (usually between 15-30%). 
                                            
10  The DRD are 12 districts (rayons) that are not subordinated to province (oblast) but directly to the 
central government.  
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There are no exact and official data on how many WUAs exist in Tajikistan. The 
following table summarizes data provided by the CFPS, ACTED, Winrock, MSDSP 
(Aga Khan Foundation), and GAA on their WUA activities. The data of some donors, 
e.g. UNDP, are missing. A more detailed list is attached in the annex. 
Table 1: Preliminary list of WUAs in Tajikistan 
WUAs on the territory of Tajikistan
Province District
Implementing 
agency Funding agency 
Number 
of WUA ha
DRD Rudaki WinRock USAID 8 1164
Khatlon Shaartuz WinRock USAID 6 2596
DRD Kabodiyon WinRock USAID 2 1379
DRD Shahrinav CFPS World Bank 3 4647
DRD Rudaki CFPS World Bank 1 997
DRD Gissor CFPS World Bank 1 1705
DRD Rudaki CFPS World Bank 3 3786*
DRD Rasht MSDSP GTZ 5 *
DRD 29 16274
Khatlon Vakhsh ACTED EC 1 677
Khatlon A. Jomi ACTED EC 1 3015
Khatlon Yovon CFPS World Bank 4 6276
Khatlon Kolkhozobad CFPS World Bank 2 14760
Khatlon Khuroson CFPS World Bank 2 5512
Khatlon Baljuvon GAA Baljuvon EC TACIS 6 1090*
Khatlon Mercy Corps 15 *
Khatlon 31 31330
Sugd Kanibadam ACTED EC 2 *
Sughd Mastcha CFPS World Bank 3 7284
Sughd Zafarobod CFPS World Bank 8 68746
Sughd Penjakent GAA Ayni EC 3 84
Sughd Ayni GAA Ayni EC 10 291*
Sughd Gornaya Matcha GAA Ayni EC 14 451*
Sughd 40 76856
total 100 124460
* no data for all WUA available  
Sources: ACTED 2005, Annex; Winrock International 2005; MSDSP n.d. 
 
Despite the incomplete data, this list shows some important characteristics of WUAs 
in Tajikistan: All existing WUAs are somehow connected to international donor 
activity. All WUAs are still in their first years of existence, and many are not 
registered yet. The area one WUA covers, varies considerably: from less than 50 ha 
to several thousand ha (see annex). The total area, managed by WUAs comprises 
less than a fifth of the total irrigated land.  
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Only the big projects (World Bank, ADB, USAID) are coordinated by the Ministry of 
Irrigation and Water Management (MIWM) (t19:57, 59). The coordination among all 
WUA projects is insufficient. It was only in October 2005, that the first meeting of all 
the donors involved in WUA establishment was held. It was initiated by the French 
NGO ACTED. Since then, monthla meetings have been conducted reflecting the 
need for better coordination.11 Meanwhile each donor had already established its 
distinctive approach, method, structure and even name for the WUAs, making a 
coherent reform even more difficult.12 Hence, there is not only no clearly formulated 
reform policy, but also no consistent and coordinated implementation.  
 
3.3 Current situation 
One can summarize that there are currently three types of organizations in the local 
irrigation management: 
 
1) Dekhan-Farm  
In places without donor engagement, there are no efforts to implement irrigation 
reform. In these places local water management is now often task of the collective 
DF. A reasonable portion of the FSK has not yet been transformed into individual 
DFs, but into collective DFs. There the old structures prevail and the DF often has a 
mirob (water master)13 who is in charge of water management. However, due to the 
legal ambiguities, the DF does not necessarily regard itself in charge of O&M, and 
lacks the funds to do it due to high debts (see chapter 5.1). 
In many cases this in practice means that nobody takes responsibility. Especially 
when one FSK has been dissolved into several DF or when there are only individual 
DFs, nobody effectively controls water distribution and cares for the maintenance of 
the channels (t26:8; t38:24-27). This situation prevails in all places without external 
donor projects.  
                                            
11  Participants at the first meetings have been representatives from ACTED, WinRock International, 
USAID, CFPS, ADB, Luis Berger International, GTZ, GAA, MSDSP, Mercy Corps, UNDP. At the 
January 2006 meeting, a representative of the MIWM also attended. 
12  Besides WUA those names are water committee, water user group, voluntary water user group, 
water and health committee. The situation is similar with other CBOs. 
13  Mirob is the Tajik word for water master. It is today used for the nominated water master of a 
village who fulfills his office by respect as well as for professional hydro-technicians hired by the 
DF, WUA or RVKh. 
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2) Focused WUAs 
The second type of organization is represented by the Water User Associations 
established solely for this objective. The WUAs of the World Bank pilot projects (by 
CFPS) and some of the bottom-up WUAs like those established by Winrock or 
ACTED fall in this category. These WUAs can be distinguished in top-down 
established WUAs and bottom-up developed WUAs. 
3) WUAs as part of CBO 
Other WUAs are established in the framework of community development (CD) 
programs. These programs focus on general community mobilization or poverty 
reduction and use water management as a means to achieve this. This broader focus 
leads to the fact that WUAs are mostly established to function within a general CBO 
such as a village development committee (VDC) that existed already before, albeit 
sometimes informally.  
 
Structure and task of WUA 
A Water User Association is an independent member organization with a 
democratically elected board and executive staff. It finances itself with members’ 
payments for the service of water delivery. Its main tasks are: 
(1) Maintenance of the on-farm irrigation system on the territory of member farms; 
(2) Operation of this system, i.e. distribution of the water obtained by the RVKh to 
member farms in an equitable manner; 
(3) Collection of ISF from its members and payment to the RVKh. 
WUAs have no uniform structure. This is because there is no nationally coordinated 
irrigation reform program, no proper legal definition about the status and tasks of 
WUAs, and a plurality of actors implementing WUAs. The following two examples are 
typical structures of WUAs: 
 15
 
Figure 2:  Organizational structure of WUA “Ravot-1”  
(Kanibadam, established by ACTED)   
Figure 3:  Organizational structure of WUA “Mirob”  
(Shakhrinov, established by CFPS) 
 
The upper half presents the administrative or legislative section, while the lower half 
is the executive section. The executive positions are normally paid, although in some 
of the bottom-up WUAs they are non-paid in the beginning. Often the WUA is divided 
into territorial sub-groups with every group sending a representative to the council. At 
the WUA “Mirob”, for example, the 464 member farms are divided into nine groups 
with every group sending a representative to the council. The council meets every 
three months, with a general assembly twice a year (t08:19). In other WUAs, the 
council meets every month. The number of staff depends on the irrigated area that 
the WUA manages. It usually consists of the director, the accountant and several 
mirobi with their number depending on the area (usually one mirob for about 500ha 
irrigated land).  
 
Funding 
The financial situation of the WUAs varies: focused WUAs get financial and material 
support. Some donors like the World Bank even pay the salaries in the initial phase. 
WUAs in CD programs often do not even have an office but use village infrastructure 
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like schools for their meetings. Salaries have to be covered by the users. The 
rehabilitation of the concerned irrigation system is done by grants provided by the 
donor. This is the basic incentive for the establishment of WUAs. The difference, 
however, is that sometimes WUAs are established after rehabilitation to care for the 
new technique. Sometimes the establishment of the WUA establishment is a 
precondition before rehabilitation starts. The registration costs are often either 
covered fully or partly by the donor. Occasionally farmers have to cover the costs 
fully themselves (ACTED 2005, Winrock International 2005).  
Another common trait among all WUAs is that after a defined period of support, they 
are expected to become self-financing through the collection of irrigation service fees 
(ISF). The ISF per m³  varies as it depends on each WUA on how much to collect. 
Those that are connected to the RVKh have to pay 1.2 Dirham per m³ to RVKh. 
Additionally, they collect slightly more to cover own expenses. If a WUA takes e.g. 
1.4 Dirham, 0.2 Dirham is used for WUA expenditures (t02:27; t08:15). 
 
4. Case Study  
For a deeper insight into the implementation process, a case study of the WUA 
“Zargar” in the Iskodar village was conducted. Iskodar belongs to the Dar-Dar 
Jaomat, in the Aini Rayon (Sughd Oblast). It is not the objective of this study to point 
out the shortcomings of this special WUA. On the contrary, as the discussion 
afterwards will show, it is exemplary for certain features that can be observed at other 
places as well. An overview will first be given on the Rayon, the village and the 
collective DF in which the WUA is situated. 
 
4.1 General Characteristics of Aini Rayon 
Aini is a mountainous Rayon in the Zerafshan valley located in the Zerafshan valley 
between the Turkestan and Fan mountain ranges. Although it is located only 150 km 
away from the capital Dushanbe and 175 km from the Northern center Khudjand, it is 
quite isolated by two passes (Anzob pass, 3,372 m, to the South and Shakhriston 
pass, 3,378 m, to the North) that are partially closed during winter (October – May). 
Due to this bad transportation situation, the valley faces difficulties in market access. 
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Figure 4: Map of the Zerafshan valley  
 
Map: GAA Khudjand, own amendments. 
 
Virtually all inhabitants (about 72,000) are involved in agriculture and livestock 
breeding. The main agricultural product is tobacco. Besides this, families grow wheat, 
potatoes and vegetables for subsistence. Apricot trees used to provide a part of the 
income (dried apricots), but in the last years, spring frosts destroyed the harvest. 
Land resources are scarce and the soil is of low quality. There are 2,984 ha pastures 
(of which 1,500 ha are in neighboring districts) and only 2,500 ha of arable farmland. 
The area of irrigated land per person is twice as low as on the national average 
(Grundmann 2005:8; t43:7). Many young men migrate to Russia to earn a living and 
support their families from there. 
 
There are 27 collective DFs and about 70 individual DFs. According to the Rayon 
representative of the state land committee, every farmer is free to choose what to 
grow on 70% of his land. A state monopoly exists on the remaining 30% of the land, 
on which tobacco is grown(t43:16). Different reports indicate that farmers have to 
give between 30-60% of their harvest to the collective DF. The land tax in Aini Rayon 
is 17,25 somoni per ha per year14. This basic fee quadruples when the land is used 
for agriculture, making it 69 somoni in practice.15 (t43:15, 20-22)  
 
                                            
14  The land tax varies for every Rayon according to the soil quality. The average land tax for Sughd 
Oblast is 31 somoni, i.e. twice the amount of Aini, which indicates the low quality of the stony soil 
in the Zerafshan valley. 
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4.2 Water Management in Aini Rayon 
960 ha of the arable farmland are irrigated by pumping irrigation, using water from 
the Zherafgan river. They are served by nine pumping stations and 70 km of 
channels. These pumping stations are in the responsibility of the district water 
management department (RVKh). In the beginning of every year the OVKh submits a 
plan to the RVKh on how much water they are allowed to use. 1540 ha land is served 
by canal irrigation from mountain sources. Many villages have self-managed canals 
that divert water directly from a source or small mountain river into the village and 
onto the fields. The RVKh is not involved in the water management here and the 
users therefore also do not have to pay ISF (t27:08, 16-17). 
 
The RVKh is located in the Rayon center, Aini. It employs 132 workers, most of 
whom are involved in the operation of the pumping stations. The RVKh is also 
responsible for the water facilities in the neighboring district of Gornaya Matcha. The 
RVKh gets 60% of its funding from the state budget and 40% from water fees. The 
collection of water fees from the DFs poses a problem. According to the director of 
the RVKh, farmers do not pay because of poverty and bad yields. The payment is 
done partially in kind (t27:15). This causes budget deficits. Especially the costs for 
electricity to run the pumping stations form a huge part of the expenditure. The 
salaries are low like everywhere in the state administration: the director earns 60 
somoni per month16. The main problem mentioned by the director of the RVKh was 
the outdated technique: the pumps are generally more than 30 years old and there 
are no investments. He ascribes this to the fact that Aini is not a cotton producing 
Rayon and therefore would see no investments or credit. There are no WUAs for the 
irrigation systems delivered by the RVKh and the RVKh is not engaged in 
establishing any. 
 
4.3 Iskodar, Dar-Dar Jaomat 
Iskodar, a village with about 300 households, is located half an hour away from the 
Rayon center Aini. It forms part of the Dar-Dar Jaomat. Iskodar consists of three 
                                                                                                                                        
15 69 somoni is equivalent to 21 Euro. With cotton cultivation the fee is only duplicated. 
16 Equivalent to 18 Euro. 
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mahallas17: Bekaron, Sodem, and Nisp. In Soviet times, Iskodar was part of a 
kolkhoz covering six villages. After initially being transformed into one collective 
Dekhan farm, it was dissolved in March 2005 into six separate collective DFs. Now 
the whole village of Iskodar forms one separate collective DF, named “Hasan 
Karamov”. The DF staff consists of the director (Rais), the brigadier, an accountant 
and a tractor operator. The DF in practice works like the kolkhoz before and is still the 
basic organization in the village. The brigadier collects 30% of the market price of the 
harvest as the members’ contribution to taxes, staff, and administration. The land tax 
is due to the inherited debts of the FSK 48 somoni per ha (t49:22). Farmers 
themselves have given various indications if and how much they pay. Neither the 
brigadier nor the Rais were able (or willing) to say how many people exactly pay their 
land tax (t28:37).  
The main agricultural product is tobacco. Tobacco is cultivated by state prescription 
and sold by the DF, not by the people themselves (t28:40; t21:5). The DF gets its 
directive of how much and of what to grow from the Rayon and is controlled by the 
Jaomat (t42:22). Some farmers stated that they, given the choice, would prefer to 
grow other crops. Additionally, households grow wheat and vegetables on their 
garden plots mainly for subsistence. There are 105 ha of irrigated fields that are 
served by a canal that brings water from a nearby mountain spring and provides the 
village with drinking and irrigation water. The canal has not been in the responsibility 
of the DF but is ascribed to the village population in general. 
The difficult environmental conditions reinforce the problems of economic transition. 
While the FSK paid its members a regular salary, the DF does not and the farmers 
earn a living only with their harvest. The majority of the village population can be 
considered very poor. In 2004, the UN distributed flour and oil to the most vulnerable 
families. Due to land scarcity and the lack of alternatives for income generation, 
many young men migrated to Russia. In almost every extended family one member 
works abroad or in Dushanbe (t42:08,15-16). 
As far as reported, nobody has exercised his right to separate from the DF and begin 
as an independent farmer. People report that costs would be too high for the small 
piece of land received: To buy the certificate would cost about 150 somoni (45 Euro) 
                                            
17  Mahalla, most often translated into “neighborhood” or “local community”, is a residential network 
in villages as well as cities that can be traced back to the 13th century. 
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(t47:10). “It would not be worth paying that money for only three or four sotka 
18“(farmer, t45:86).  
 
4.4 The WUA “Zargar” 
The WUA “Zargar” was established in 2005 in Iskodar for all farmers of the collective 
DF. It is part of a community development project by the German Agro Action, hence 
it presents the third type of WUA as described above. The main reason for its 
establishment was a project for the rehabilitation of the canal by GAA. The WUA 
should guarantee maintenance of the canal and distribution of irrigation and drinking 
water. With this establishment irrigation management switched from the DF to the 
WUA. Before the establishment of the WUA, there was a mirob who distributed the 
water but nobody was responsible for the maintenance of the system as a whole 
(t48:13-14). Also, since the mirob did not receive a salary from the kolkhoz after its 
dissolution, he ceased to fulfill his work as required (t49:4). The WUA was formally 
established on 08/07/2005 but it is not yet officially registered. It started working 
about two months before field research. The WUA has about 300 members, i.e. all 
the households in the village.  
 
WUA and VDC 
The WUA is closely connected to the Village Development Committee (VDC). The 
VDC was established in April 2004 when GAA started to work in the village as a 
counterpart for its projects. The VDC has nine members (including two women). 
According to the council members, the initiative to establish the VDC came from its 
chair, the Rais of the DF. The VDC initially held its meetings in the school, but later 
got a room in a building belonging to the DF. The VDC and the WUA are difficult to 
separate. The members of the VDC are the members of the WUA council. There are 
three members from every mahalla in the WUA council/VDC.  As a GAA 
representative explained, it would make no sense to elect a new committee for the 
WUA as the most respected people of the village are in the VDC and people would 
nominate them again.  
 
                                            
18  Sotka is the traditional Russian measurement of land. One sotka is 100m² (0.01 ha). 
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Figure 5: Organizational Structure of the WUA “Zargar” 
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Concerning internal structure, there is no clear separation of the legislative and 
executive as intended in the structure because the paid position of a director is not 
filled but performed by the VDC chairman. The paid positions are of the sanitary 
technician and the mirob, who each earn 30 somoni per month19. There is also one 
accountant who does not get a salary yet. The mirob, who is appointed by the VDC, 
can be regarded as a technical executor of the chairman’s decisions. It is the 
chairman who gives the mirob precise instructions about water distribution. 
Statements about council meetings differed. According to the Rais, the council would 
meet every morning. General meetings were held on the 25th of each 
month.However, during research it was not possible to witness this. Another council 
member said that the whole council would meet only twice a year.  
 
ISF payment 
In order to cover the costs of maintenance and the salaries of the WUA staff, it is 
entitled to collect ISF from the villagers. The WUA chair said that they collected 1 
somoni from every WUA member as a starting fee. Then farmers will have to pay 5 
somoni per year per 10 sotka for irrigation water and 20 Dirham per person per 
month for drinking water (t49:6). Even though this decision was reportedly made at a 
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village meeting, most of the people interviewed have not been asked for payment yet 
and did not know that they are expected to pay for water in future. Some people 
heard rumors about future fees. The attitude towards fees differed: some considered 
it justified as the canal was repaired now, others were reluctant. This contradicts 
statements of the WUA chair who claimed that after some initial difficulties, 80% of 
the farmers would now pay (t49:9-10). 
It also has to be mentioned that there are no water meters to control exactly how 
much water each farmer uses. The mirob calculates the water volume by the flow 
velocity. The ISF is calculated according to land size and not actual water use. As all 
farmers grow more or less the same products (due to state prescriptions), they also 
use more or less the same amount of water.  
 
Community awareness 
Community awareness is seen as a key component to reach sustainability of the 
WUA and changes of behavior patterns in water management. Like all CD programs 
GAA conducted several awareness raising campaigns in Iskodar. 
Before the VDC was established, GAA staff visited the village about 12 times during 
three months and organized meetings and seminars (t44:8). GAA met in the 
beginning with a group of eight people, including the Rais of the DF, representatives 
of the Mahalla committee20, the school director and the mullah. They were asked to 
spread information and invite more people to future meetings. At these meetings 
people have said that they prefer to set up a new committee instead of using the 
existing Mahalla committee for cooperation with GAA (t44:11). 
The members of the VDC were elected by a general village assembly. This meeting 
was attended by 70 to 80 mainly male participants of all three mahallas. (t44:2). Due 
to the fact that the so-called general village assemblies are seldom really assemblies 
of the whole village, the new WUA organizational chart of GAA names it “meeting of 
village representatives”. This name mirrors reality more unambiguously.  
The villagers are requested to contribute 25% of the costs of the rehabilitation project 
as another means to ensure ownership and sustainability. Since they can “pay” these 
                                                                                                                                        
19  Equivalent to approximately 9 Euro. 
20  See chapter 4.5 
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with working time, several hashari 21 have been organized to do the necessary work. 
This was organized by the chair of the VDC.  
However when speaking with the villagers, hardly anybody knew the VDC nor the 
WUA. If people knew the VDC it was because of the presentation of GAA. Even then 
it was not entirely clear to them what exactly the VDC and the WUA are doing as its 
members would not inform the public about the meetings. The usual reaction from 
people who heard about WUA was: “Yes, they were here, they rehabilitated the 
canal” or “They brought the drinking water to the mahalla”. People referred to it in the 
third person. Virtually nobody was aware that he himself was a member of this 
organization. Also those villagers who participated in the hashari were not really 
aware of the meaning of WUA. People connect all these events to the Rais and not 
to VDC or WUA. 
Even one member of the VDC did not know about the WUA (t42:27). This man was 
not even sure if he is a member at VDC, as he is a member of almost all important 
groups at the village-, Jaomat-, and obviously also Rayon-levels: “There is now this 
VDC in the village. Probably I am a member there as well. Well, I am a member 
everywhere. Wherever they establish a group, they elect me to it.” (t42:30).  
WUA is part of a CD project with assumably more community mobilization activities 
then top-down established WUAs. Still a broad community awareness is virtually non-
existent. How can this be explained? The next chapter will take a closer look at the 
local institutions and the role they play in the village and for the WUA. 
 
4.5 The role of local institutions  
There seems to be a general lack of information and differing perceptions about the 
roles played by the different formal and informal institutions in village life. There are 
some institutions at local level that are concerned with the WUA. These are the 
Jaomat, the mahalla committee, the general village assembly  and the Dekhan Farm. 
 
                                            
21  Hashar may be defined as communal labor or cooperative work for which people work free of charge while 
the materials are provided by richer inhabitants or in Soviet times by the kolkhoz. Hashari have been 
traditionally organized by the Mahalla committee, but today they are also organized by the director of the 
FSK/DF. 
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State organizations 
There is no relation of the WUA to the RVKh as the village is not connected to state-
run water systems and therefore does not have to pay water fees to the state. The 
extent of RVKh involvement (as well as of the Jaomat) is to be invited to all GAA-
organized pre-establishment activities. It is also a party to the contract on the 
establishment of WUA between VDC, GAA, Jaomat and RVKh, which forms the 
basis for GAA activities (t48:24).  
Jaomat is the local organization of self-governance in towns and villages. Iskodar is 
part of the Jaomat Dar-Dar. The Jaomat is not only a party of the above mentioned 
contract, but is also in other ways formally involved in WUA activities. The chair of the 
mahalla committee (and member of WUA council) is also a representative to the 
Jaomat.22 Furthermore, the director of the Jaomat himself is from Iskodar. In practice 
however, the Jaomat is astonishingly absent and the above described connections 
were never mentioned by WUA council members when asked about their relationship 
with the Jaomat. The interviewed member of the Jaomat council stated the Jaomat 
itself could not act due to the lack of resources23 but that representatives would 
participate in meetings (t42:17-21). State structures do not appear directly in the daily 
village life and in WUA performance. If they play a role, then it is performed through 
the Rais or the brigadier who are perceived as representatives of the 
Jaomat/Khukumat decisions. 
 
Mahalla committee 
The most important local (informal) organization is the mahalla committee. The 
mahalla committee, consisting of local elders and other respected members of the 
community, is the lowest level of local self-organization. It is an institution that 
organizes collective religious and social events (like births, weddings and funerals), 
solves conflicts and provides social services. It defines and perpetuates local values 
and norms of behavior. The mahalla committee also has the authority to organize 
hashari. After the Soviet authorities’ attempts to supersede it failed, it was tolerated 
but never got a formal legal base. During Soviet times, village life was organized by 
                                            
22  The Jaomat has a council of five people from every village. They are not elected but appointed at 
the village assembly. They meet once in three months. 
23  Although Jaomats get some finances that are allocated by the Rayon councils, they do not have a 
budget in a true sense (Ilolov, Khodoiyev 2001: 614).  
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the village council (soviet kishlaka) and the brigades. Now there are attempts to 
formalize the mahalla committee and transform it into an official state structure for 
local governance. However, the nature and performance of mahalla vary 
considerably in the different regions and from village to village (see Ilolov, Khudoiyev 
2001; Grundmann 2004:8f). 
The seven members of the mahalla committee work unsalaried. They were elected 
several years ago (in 1995 or 1996) without re-elections since then. The committee is 
responsible for the whole village (t42:6-10). Some state that the mahalla committee 
represents the Jaomat in the village and that its function is mainly to implement 
Jaomat decisions (t28:31; Grundmann 2004: 18). The director of the mahalla 
committee is also in the VDC and a deputy to the Jaomat council.  
The mahalla committee was approached by GAA initially in the process of VDC 
development. It is interlinked with the WUA council: the director of the mahalla 
committee is a member of the WUA council and the director of the WUA is a member 
in the mahalla committee. As the VDC/WUA has access to resources, it gains more 
importance than the mahalla committee, which is reduced to its social and religious 
functions. 
 
General village assembly 
The WUA receives its legitimization through the general village assembly. Village 
meetings are said to be held every Tuesday. Many locals, however, do not know 
about them or do not attend because they don’t have time; because real problems 
would  not be discussed; or because “only old men go there” (t46:12-13,30-32). 
Generally, about 15-20 people from every mahalla actually participate in such 
meetings (t48:6). A general village meeting therefore hardly includes the whole 
village population.  
Most of the local population did not know exactly about the mahalla committee or the 
village meetings and did not really appreciate its work.  
“I haven’t participated in village meetings for seven years as I am too sick. Nobody 
from the mahalla committee comes to us and gives us information, they are not 
interested in us. I do not even know who is in the committee.”(t46:46-47).  
 
Therefore little knowledge and awareness of WUA/VDC is not a special feature of 
this organization. In general a majority of the village population is marginalized in 
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local decision making processes;  formal as well as the informal structures are 
dysfunctional in this respect. 
 
The Dekhan Farm 
Despite all the institutions that are formally or informally legitimized to organize 
village life, the main local organization remains the DF as a subsequent organization 
of the kolkhoz. The Director of the DF, the Rais, is often referred to as Rais of the 
village. People expect the DF to be in charge of the village’s well-being. This 
perception is a result and heritage of the kolkhoz (and the Soviet state in general), 
which provided them with all they needed for living; an attitude often referred to as 
‘Soviet mentality’. The powerful position of the Dekhan Farm will be visible in the next 
chapter which discusses the role of the Rais and the brigadier of the DF. 
 
4.6 Power relations in the village 
In theory, the VDC – and therewith also the WUA - is meant to be “established 
independently from the official administrative village structure” and to “[involve] the 
entire village community”24. In practice however, it mirrors the existing power 
structures in the village. The chair of the VDC/WUA is the Rais of the DF. This Rais 
was in Soviet times the leading economist of the kolkhoz, then brigadier of the 
collective DF, and after the dissolution of the previous big DF he became the director 
of the new DF “Hasan Karamov”. It is important to note that the brigadier in Soviet 
times was one of the most important and respected persons in the FSK. According to 
Grundmann, the Brigadier is often perceived as the de facto leader of the village as 
he controls the most scarce resource – land (and he is the one responsible for 
implementing the prescriptions) (Grundmann 2004: 19, 26).  
 
Most people obviously do not know who to approach after the dissolution of the 
kolkhoz. People often mention that there are no village structures that care for village 
life and that everybody is responsible for himself. If they mention someone at all, then 
it is the Rais personally since hardly anybody knows about the WUA or the VDC 
(t46:8-10;t45:12). Even when asked about the responsible organizations in the 
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village, people simply mentioned the name of the Rais (t46:19). Only one person said 
that the mahalla committee, namely the chair of the committee, is responsible. 
(t46:63). The Rais is the unchallenged leader of the village. Like an old woman said: 
“Whatever the Rais says, we have to do.” (t45:82). At the time when the VDC was 
established, the current Rais was still the brigadier and through this function became 
chair of the VDC. The Rais earned his position of power from his time as brigadier. 
His position now might be even reinforced. As WUA director he not only controls land 
resources but also water resources. Though there is still a Mirob responsible for the 
day-to-day water distribution, he functions merely as a technical assistant for 
implementing the Rais’ decisions. Though there is a new brigadier now, he is a 
young, reserved man who obviously does not have the expected attributes of a 
brigadier but functions as an assistant to the Rais. The Rais could thus prevent a 
challenge to his patronage network. 
On the other hand, most people seem to expect the Rais to care for everything and 
to mobilize resources. As the Rais himself said: “People need somebody to guide 
them [rukovodit]” (t49:27). This is at least what they are used to and what in the 
village self came hardly into question. A consequence of this mentality is a lack of 
proactiveness. When asked, who should be responsible, people mentioned the Rais, 
not the mahalla committee or the Jaomat. 
Those who are not part of his network feel excluded and face difficulties in getting 
access to information about village activities: “The Rais has his own group and I am 
not part of it.” (t45:78). Grundmann (2004: 20) comes to the conclusion:  
“It therefore can be said that VDCs have not been established ‘independently’ but along 
the official administrative village structure (...). The current structure of the VDC is a 
collection of the main acting key figures and falls some way short of a body ‘which 
involves the entire village community’ (...)”. 
 
As GAA used the village leaders as intermediaries for their CD activities and did not 
approach the population directly, their position was reinforced. They are after all the 
ones who have access to resources and information that the rest of the population 
lacks. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
24  GAA-Application form to ECHO; Food Security Programme NGO 2002; Annex A, cited in 
Grundmann 2004:20. 
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5. Discussion 
The case study exemplarily showed, how closely the apparently technical issue of 
managing an irrigation channel is connected to questions of power and local politics, 
and how it is framed by economic conditions. This could however be a single case 
without wider relevance. Therefore certain aspects that turned out to be critical in the 
case study are discussed in order to show how they are apparent in the reform 
process in general. 
I would like to distinguish three political factors crucial to the understanding of 
irrigation management and reform processes: Firstly, the practice of land reform 
differs from the policy outlines, which has constraining impacts on the agricultural 
sector and on irrigation reform. Secondly, the institutions at local level that present 
the environment in which the irrigation reform has to be implemented.25 The third 
factor is the role allocation between national and international actors in the policy 
process that affects ownership and scope for action.  
 
5.1 The practice of land reform 
Land reform was not just one of the main reasons why local irrigation management 
had to be reformed. It is also a main influencing factor for implementation as it 
shapes conditions. Chapter 2.3 provided a short outline of the land reform conducted 
so far. It mainly referred to the theory of land reform and how it is exposed in the 
policy documents. This chapter now will take a look at the practice of land reform that 
is considerably different. Even though official data suggests a successful and rapid 
reorganization, land reform is conducted very slowly and rather cosmetically.  
The land managed by independent Dekhan farms is still very small compared to the 
collective DF. And those are mostly the old FSK with new names. By February 2005, 
only 9% of the agricultural land in Tajikistan was managed by independent farms 
(ICG 2005: 8). “Almost everything stayed as it was. They only gave the land for rent 
and named it Dekhan Farm”, said the Vice-Minister of the MIWM (t05:81). 
An important point is that land is not redistributed “automatically” – like e.g. in 
Kyrgyzstan – but farmers have to apply for it, i.e. they have to become proactive 
                                            
25  Environment in this respect refers to the institutional environment, i.e. the underlying fundamental 
norms and rules of a society while the concrete institutional arrangements (e.g. governance 
structure) are an outcome of these. 
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themselves. Most of the farmers do not know about the reform and their rights. In the 
earlier mentioned AAH survey, 92.2% of the respondents did not know how to apply 
for a land certificate. Many did even not know what a Dekhan farm is. There is 
widespread ‘legal illiteracy’ among farmers. If farmers know about application 
procedures, the next hindrance is the high cost of the certificate. The official costs 
are 6 US-Dollar plus service charges (Presidential decree No. 600, Annex 3, 
12/30/2001). The actual costs are considerably higher, like 55 US-Dollar in Iskodar. 
According to different sources, they are indicated with up to 300 US-Dollar with an 
average of about 50 US-Dollar (AAH 2003: 19f; t34:06). There are also cases where 
applications are refused, applicants are discouraged by local officials or whole 
sovkhozes or kolkhozes are declared as seed production or livestock breeding farms 
to prevent the establishment of independent DFs (AAH 2003: 21).  
At first sight it might seem unnecessary to create WUAs where there is a collective 
DF. WUAs are an additional burden on the farmers and they are servicing the exact 
area and all members of the DF. A better strategy could perhaps be to support DFs 
to become real agricultural cooperatives that care for water, technique, etc. Upon 
closer inspection however, this approach is shortsighted. More and more collective 
DFs are disintegrating and it seems to be only a matter of time until they are 
dissolved entirely. Additionally, a WUA would make farmers less dependent on the 
DF that would not control access to all resources anymore. With less dependence, 
farmers could easier separate and set up individual farms. Irrigation reform therefore 
could contribute to land reform. 
The major obstacles to effective land reform, however, are the persisting features of 
the cotton sector, which is the most important and most water-intensive agricultural 
crop. They will be described now in detail. 
 
5.1.1 Production prescriptions 
The prevalence of collective DFs is not the only hindrance to effective land reform. 
Another major point is that the guaranteed non-interference of government (Art. 5, 
Law “On Dekhan Farms”) is not realized. As already seen with the tobacco quotas in 
Iskodar, state prescriptions for production have not been abolished yet. This affects 
cotton especially. As cotton is of huge economic importance it was widely excluded 
from land reform and privatization to secure benefits for the state. A yearly production 
plan is distributed to the Oblasts and Rayons. The Rayon administration (Khukumat) 
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distributes this to all the farms - be it state farms, collective DFs or individual DFs. 
Each farmer has to produce the specified amount of cotton. In cotton regions 70-80% 
of the land on average has to be used for cotton cultivation. The farmer is only free to 
decide what to grow on the remaining area (AAH 2003: 9-11). 
As a further incentive, the land tax is reduced by 50% for cotton-cultivated fields 
(t43:17). Such an incentive is not enough for farmers to grow cotton voluntarily, as 
cotton generally brings less gains for the farmers than other crops (UNDP 2003: 39f). 
The reason why farmers do not gain from cultivating cotton is due to the structure of 
the cotton business, which is described in the next point.  
Besides those instructions, there are a number of informal pressures for cotton-
growing: Access to key resources like water, seeds, fertilizers or credit are often 
dependent on cotton cultivation. One NGO representative ironically describes the 
situation: 
“If I am a really smart farmer and have studied in Cambridge, then I would know my 
rights and could get access to land. But when I then will not grow cotton, I will not get 
any water.” (NGO representative, t15:14).  
 
Such constraints limit the variety of choices for a farmer to e.g. redirect production to 
less water-intensive crops. For farmers it is actually already more lucrative to grow 
other crops like fruits, which would give them more profit and that do not require as 
much water as cotton. But they simply do not have the chance to change  the 
cultivation patterns.  
 
5.1.2 Debt crisis 
Closely connected to the state cotton quotas is the high debts of many farms 
resulting in financial dependency. As in Iskodar, new DFs inherited the debts of their 
preceding FSKs, most of which owed the state payments for water, electricity etc. 
According to IMF estimations, the FSKs altogether owed about US-Dollar 125 Mio to 
the Tajik government at the time of reorganization. These debts have been 
distributed to the new farms according to size. As such most farms have debts 
ranging from several hundred to more than 1,000 US-Dollar per ha (AAH 2003: 12). 
Those indebted farms have to cultivate cotton on state demand but have to buy all 
the necessary inputs themselves. In this situation most farmers are dependent on 
local investors, so-called “futures companies” (“fjucherskie”), that provide pre-finance 
for cotton production. At the beginning of the agricultural year they provide seeds, 
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fertilizer, fuel, salaries and other inputs as credit that has to be paid back with the 
cotton harvest. As the value of the harvest is often less than the value of the input 
(due to bad harvests and overprized inputs), farmers are indebted to the investors 
and are obliged to continue to work with them the next year and a vicious circle 
starts. The local investors on their part are contractors of the Swiss company Paul 
Reinhart AG, which controls 95% of all Tajik cotton exports. The practice of the local 
investors, which each have a monopoly on a certain region, is the object of frequent 
complaints by farmers. Complaints concern overprized inputs, bad seed and fertilizer 
quality, late payments and deliveries. On the other hand, some fjucherskie 
meanwhile took over state tasks like funding hospitals, rehabilitating irrigation 
infrastructure or providing schools with computers. They are the ones who have 
made the most profit from cotton production and who have benefited the most from 
land reform (AAH 2003: 12-15; UNDP 2003: 37-42; ICG 2005: 8-10).  
Additionally one has to consider that many workers on collective DFs only get a very 
small (less than US-Dollar 10 per year) or no salary. Besides the  lack of alternatives 
the main reason why people still work on the farms is because the Dekhan farms 
provide (like the FSKs before) families with garden plots.26 Hence the local economy 
mainly survives on barter trade and revenues from migrant workers in Russia and 
other CIS countries. 
These three factors – prevalence of old farm structures, product prescriptions and 
debt crisis - do not only impede land reform but also hinder farmers from using the 
full economic potential of their land. The de facto possibilities vary considerably from 
the de jure possibilities. Lack of knowledge and experience, no access to markets, 
corruption and limited choices on what to grow are the main obstacles to effective 
land reform (Bucknall et al 2003:4).  
These factors also influence irrigation reform. Even if irrigation systems are 
rehabilitated, their impact is restricted: the land might now be served with water but 
the farmer has no access to the land. Or the farmer has land but he cannot use it to 
maximize the profit. Instead he has to grow state prescriptions and therefore cannot 
pay his water bill so that inadequate funding of the water infrastructure remains. As 
                                            
26  In cotton growing areas, farm workers get the cotton sticks they use as fuel material in winter. 
The significance of these cotton sticks in areas with no gas and electricity should not be 
underestimated: In the AAH survey many households said they would stop working for the 
Dekhan farm if they were not dependent on cotton sticks. Sometimes these sticks are the only 
‘salary’ people get (AAH 2003: 15f.; ICG 2005: 10). 
 32
described in chapter 3.2 most of the irrigation reform projects are part of wider-
focused agricultural programs. The effect of those programs is hindered by these 
conditions.  “Donors always want to support democracy and societal development, 
but it stops at the corruption in the cotton market.” (deputy regional director of an 
international donor agency, t50:31) 
 
5.1.3 Coordination of land reform and water reform 
Besides the above described impact of land reform on irrigation management, the 
deep dependency of agriculture on irrigation makes coordination between land and 
water reform pertinent. This is widely acknowledged by the experts in the respective 
state agencies:   
“In Tajikistan, land reform without water is not possible (...). That is why we conduct a 
land-water reform.”27 (Vice Minister of Irrigation and Water Management, t05:72)28. 
 
 This involves the establishment of Water User Associations:  
“It is a mandatory process: if there are private Dekhan farms, they have to have 
associations of water users.”29 (senior official, MIWM, t07:64).  
 
Despite the affirmation of the close interrelation of both issues by policy actors, it is 
not so in practice.  
A real coordination would have been started initiated at the beginning of the land 
reform with the redistribution of plots along hydrological principles. Now some 
Dekhan farms own fields at different channels that makes WUA establishment along 
hydrological boundaries difficult, as this would mean that one DF has to be a member 
in different WUAs. As the new farms are still oriented along the FSKs, WUAs also 
have to be oriented along those boundaries for practical reasons. This reinforces the 
dominance of the former FSK power holders and the institutional factors (discussed 
later in chapter 5.2) instead of turning towards a hydrological organization. 
A juridical directive for the irrigation systems formerly in owned by the FSK is given in 
exhibit No. 2 to the Law 522. Paragraph 7 contains regulations for the transfer of the 
on-farm and off-farm irrigation facilities to the respective ministry. The regulation is 
non-compulsory, however,  and without any clear guidelines. As the water 
                                            
27  (В Таджикистане реформа земельная без воды никак не возможна (...) Поэтому мы 
проводим земельно-водную реформу) 
28  Similar:  t07:64, t14:23; t15:19, t19:39; t25:32. 
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administration was not interested in getting the deteriorated irrigation facilities into its 
responsibility, it mostly stayed the responsibility of the collective DF. In places with 
primarily individual DFs, the secondary channels are perceived as nobody’s 
responsibility. In many cases the consequence is that farmers at the upper end of a 
channel use as much water as they want. They sometimes regard the part of the 
channel crossing their territory as their property, giving them the right of full usage 
(t25:38).  
Despite different instructions, no implementation mechanism have been developed 
as yet for the mentioned directive. This is ascribed to the reluctance of the MIWM to 
take over the former FSK channels, as this would mean an extra burden and the 
need for additional finances that have not been allocated. On local level, according to 
the land committee, there is not the input of RVKh in land reform issues as would be 
required to make it sound (t32:7-10). 
This unclear status of the water management facilities and the resulting uncertainty 
regarding access to water contributed to the reluctance towards  the dissolution of 
the FSK. As mentioned, the DF still controls access to the main resources,  esp. land 
and water. The fear of lacking access to water is obviously a further hindrance to 
farmers becoming independent. They remain in the collective DF as they then have a 
perceived secure access to irrigation water. Imperfect land reform impedes irrigation 
reform and vice versa: Deficiencies in irrigation reform create insecurities for farmers, 
thereby hindering their empowerment against vested interests. Once again 
ambiguities in legislature, the lack of political will to implement policy decisions and 
the farmers’ lack of information and knowledge are obstacles for reform.   
 
5.2 Institutional factors in implementation 
After the discussion of the implications of the agricultural sector as a whole process, 
this chapter is devoted to the local level. This is the level where the reform finally has 
to be effective. The institutions at local level present the environment in which local 
water management is embedded and in which irrigation reform has to be 
implemented.  
                                                                                                                                        
29  (Это обязательная процедура: если есть частное дехканское хозяйство, у них должна быть 
ассоциация водопользователей) 
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5.2.1 Role of local institutions 
WUAs are established as new organizations in an existing pattern of local institutions 
directly or indirectly dealing with water issues. Bottom-up projects often actively 
involve local organizations and institutions by including the village assembly and/or 
the Mahalla committee in the process and by using rules of hashari. The CD projects 
refer to a certain ‘community’ as a partner and try to incorporate its traditional 
organizations into the programs. Such an inclusion can ease the acceptance of the 
new organization by the farmers. Some local organizations have democratic 
potential: mahalla committees and their directors are in theory elected on consensus 
and people can complain to them. How far this is true in practice depends highly on 
the specific community, as each village is characterized by other power structures. 
The local level can be rather democratic or highly unequal (t30:29-30).  
The most popular local institution used in irrigation management is the hashari. As 
mentioned in the case study, hashari are organized voluntary work by community 
members, and they are traditionally organized by the mahalla committee. In many 
places without WUAs hashari are the only mode in which channels have been 
maintained since independence and are therefore an inherent part of water 
management. In many WUAs hashari are used for the community contribution to the 
project or for food-for-work programs. They are often organized by the director of the 
DF and not by the director of the Mahalla committee. The hashar has its limitations 
though. It may be suitable for small canals but not for big channels that need 
professional supervision and equipment (excavator etc.). One also has to consider 
that one of the basic principles of hashar is voluntarism. This is lost when it becomes 
a compulsory part of donor projects.  
The role of the local institutions is limited by the decision to establish new structures 
instead of to incorporate water management into existing ones, e.g. by broadening  
the responsibility of the mahalla committee. This example was recommended by a 
local NGO, as this would be suitable for the complex character of local water 
management and ease acceptance by the population. As the mahalla already is 
responsible for a lot of tasks in local community life, water could be integrated easily 
(t15:22). The task of irrigation reform then would be to strengthen their capacities and 
democratic features and to make them transparent and participatory community 
organizations. Most CD projects however work rather with local institutions than for 
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them. While those projects want to be locally adaptable, they still want to set up their 
“own” organizations and only use those existing institutions in an instrumental way.  
One of the donors’ arguments is that official local organizations like the Jaomat 
council (sovet Jaomata), the mahalla committee or the DF director are not 
democratically elected bodies but nominated by the Jaomat. If they establish new 
bodies, the process would be transparent right from the beginning. In practice 
however, it is questionable, if the process of setting up a VDC or WUA can differ 
considerably from other local bodies, as the same institutional conditions apply to 
both (see subsequent chapter). 
One means to ensure an open and transparent process and democratic legitimacy of 
the WUA is the inclusion of the village assembly in its establishment process. Many 
donors follow a rather unreflected, idealized notion of the ‘village community’ and 
seem to perceive a village assembly as a public sphere free of domination and where 
competing interests and opinions are articulated freely. This ideal is unsurprisingly 
not met in reality. The general assembly is in many cases not an assembly of all 
adults, but a meeting of invited representatives of the different village mahallas. If 
and how far those representatives spread the information differs. Many village 
meetings are Maraka - men only. However most agricultural work is done by women. 
Due to inexistent or marginal salaries, many men migrate to Russia or other CIS 
countries.30 Since independence Tajikistan therefore faces a growing “feminization of 
agricultural labor force” (AAH 2003: 17). As such they should be the main target 
group for projects aimed at the agricultural sector. However, women are only 
marginally represented in local decision making processes. The public participation 
of women is often limited and sometimes they are completely excluded. A 
fundamental question is whether those ‘traditional’ decision making mechanisms are 
still applicable to post-Soviet realities and can legitimize WUAs. Unsatisfactory 
mechanisms have resulted in farmers being unaware that they are members of a 
WUA. But voluntary membership of empowered farmers is a basic feature of WUA. If 
this is not achieved, irrigation reform would in essence have the same effect as land 
reform: presenting options on papers to farmers that are not free to choose in reality.  
Often it is the same people who are nominated for all local organizations. According 
to a UNDP representative, about half of the VDC members in its projects are also 
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members in the Jaomat council (t50:25). At WUAs the leaders of the DF often play an 
important role. This confirms again the prevailing importance of the FSK that already 
has been visible in land reform. The FSK was not only an economic entity and work 
place, but “the principal unit of social organization” (AHH 2003: 1) in rural areas. 
Inside the FSK, members were organized into brigades that were responsible for 
certain parts of the land. Families of FSK members got a house and a garden plot for 
their own consumption production. FSK were responsible for health care, education 
and social welfare. This strong role prevails within the collective DF. The brigades – 
the sub-unit of the FSK – are also often still (informally) existent. The sub-groups of 
the WUA are sometimes organized according to the former brigades.  
The dilemma is that donors can establish democratic mechanisms (like elections) but 
these can only serve as a frame for democracy. Democracy itself is a societal 
process. Therefore WUAs or similar organizations can provide the framework, but 
this can also be undermined by patronage as the central mode of politics. This will be 
described in the following chapter. 
                                                                                                                                        
30  According to IOM, since 2000 about 632,000 men from Tajikistan worked as migrant laborers 
abroad (that is almost 10% of the whole population). 84% work in Russia. (AAH 2003: 17). 
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5.2.2 Patronage politics 
Political culture describes the attitude of the individual towards the political system. 
While political culture is not an institution, it is an effect of institutions. It is shaped by 
societal and cultural institutions that create a system of shared beliefs, norms, 
morals, traditions and orientations of a society. Analyzing the political culture of a 
state allows inferences on the influence of institutional factors. One of the reasons 
why newly established organizations work the same way as previous village 
institutions can be found in the political culture. The political culture is characterized 
by a lack of proactiveness and an orientation towards the village leaders along with a 
personalization of organizations. Patronage is the central mode of politics. 
Historically, networks have been mainly built along kinship ties. Despite often being 
considered as pre-Soviet institutions, those values and loyalties still play a role. The 
sovkhozes and kolkhozes replaced the former kinship-based organization only 
superficially. 
Other so-called pre-Soviet social institutions have also not been replaced by Soviet 
ones, as the official historiography and also the majority of Western scholars 
suggest. Instead in many cases they have been only superficially superposed, 
transformed or even strengthened by Soviet ones: Hashari have been transformed 
into “Subotniki”, the Soviet form of collective voluntary work; brigades were organized 
parallel to Mahalla structures (Roy 2000: 85-100; Grundmann 2004: 10). 
The Soviet Union did also not present a fundamental change of the logic of 
patronage politics. Independence and privatization did not change it either. Again 
names have been changed but personal affiliation, networks and patronage as the 
fundamental mode of distribution of resources remained. The case study showed 
clearly how the role of the patron is fulfilled by the chief of the Dekhan Farm, who 
was the brigadier of the kolkhoz. The center for resource distribution is no longer the 
party committee in Dushanbe but the government, private structures (like the cotton 
investors), and international donor organizations. The agency for distributing these 
resources is no longer the FSK but newly established organizations like VDCs or 
WUAs, who on their part are staffed with the old patrons of the Soviet system. People 
were accustomed to the Soviet system that cared for everything, and then they 
witnessed international humanitarian aid take on this role. Now they expect 
international donors to continue doing this. The involvement of intermediaries, which 
is necessary to fulfill the tight timeframes and target orientation of development 
 38
projects, strengthens existing leaders. They not only have access to resources, but 
also receive further training and knowledge which can even intensify inequality. This 
new role of the patron could be defined as “local development broker”, a category 
recently introduced in development sociology to describe the role of intermediaries 
between the local population (the target group) and development agencies 
(Bierschenk et al. 2002). 
The people’s lack of awareness about WUAs and other structural changes (like the 
transformation of the FSK into DFs) is due to the lack of access to information and 
the fact that those transformations do not affect power relations in their daily life. For 
local people, the structures remained more or less the same. This is especially since 
roles are normally affiliated to persons and not organizations.31 The Rais is the 
patron of the village. Whether he is the Rais of the Kolkhoz, the DF or the WUA and 
whether his networks lead to Moscow, Dushanbe or an international donor, is 
secondary and often unknown. 
As donor agencies make contact with village authorities at the start, they reinforce 
those power relations. Some donors start by asking the Jaomat to select the 
participants of the villages for the first meeting. This is not always voluntarly, though: 
There have been reported cases, where donors have been obliged to take a 
representative of the Khukumat with them to all meetings. The non-democratic 
environment and low degree of decentralization present a difficult environment for 
implementing and fostering projects aimed at strengthening local self-governance.  
Yet different methods are used to avoid the exclusion of certain groups and the 
dominance of particular interests: inclusion of people like the school director or 
doctors in the initial group; community mobilization; discussions with the village 
assembly; women’s meetings. It is still difficult to overcome those power structures 
since in most cases WUAs are established without the  necessary timeframe to really 
empower people. Time frames are tight once villages are selected to participate in a 
project. In general, the reported time between project approval and  the 
establishment of the committee varies from one meeting to three months or even six 
                                            
31  The strong affiliation to persons instead of organizations is not a phenomena restricted to only the 
local level. The WUA program of the World Bank, e.g. is very often simply named “projekt 
Ostanaeva” or “tsentr Ostanaeva” (Ostanaev’s project, Ostanaev’s center) by other officials 
according to the director of the CFPS that implements the project. And it is also a main 
characteristic of the political regimes of Central Asia in general, where especially the position of 
the president is extremely personalized. 
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months. The average seems to be about three months. However if one would like to 
achieve real participation, organizing some (or only one) village meetings is not 
sufficient. One must start with much more basic activities. E.g. part of the population 
cannot read and understand the materials and documents provided. It is striking that 
the time required to raise public awareness is not considered in most projects, 
although there seems to be a consensus that a change of mentality concerning water 
use is crucial.  
At this point it should be mentioned that my findings here derive mainly from bottom-
up developed WUAs that put more emphasis on raising awareness than top-down 
established ones. Compared with top-down WUAs in a similar context (Sehring 
2005), there is no substantial difference in that respect to observe. The question is 
whether these different apporaches acutally do make a difference or if the local 
institutional setting is dominant. Further research would be necessary here.32 
5.3 Actors in policy formulation and implementation 
After the first two chapters of the discussion were mainly focused on the 
implementation, it is also necessary to broaden the perspective on the policy process 
as a whole. The next section will discuss especially the role different actors play and 
its consequences for the reform. 
 
5.3.1 The role of government agencies  
As mentioned in chapter 3.1 the government issued a new Water Code in 2000, 
which underwent some minor changes in 2003. However, there are obviously no 
government efforts to create  awareness about this law, which would be a 
prerequisite for its proper implementation. The law is widely unknown as no 
information about it and no copies of it are available. Even the concerned state 
agencies often only posses a single copy or none at all:  
“We could convince ourselves that today many people do not know the legal basis of 
water usage. Even experts. First, virtually nobody has the water code. (...)  There was 
a amendment in 2003. This is the new version of the water code. Unfortunately 
virtually nobody knows it. When we went to the regions we asked: Do you have the 
water code? They said: No.“ (NGO representative, t01a:05) 
 
                                            
32 See for discussion Platteau 2004; Chhotray 2004. 
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People do not know their rights and if they do, they do not know whom to approach 
when their rights are violated. However, it is not only the population, but even the 
concerned agencies who do not have sufficient information about the law. They 
therefore do not know how to apply it. The consequences are vividly reported by a 
director of a RVKh: After a case of water theft33 he first wrote a letter to the director of 
the concerned dekhan-farm that he should prosecute the perpetrator. But the director 
did not react. He then turned to the court, but that was ineffective, as the court did not 
know how to apply the law (t16:30-32). Until now no one has been prosecuted in 
Tajikistan for the violation of the water law. 
 
The main efforts to implement irrigation reform in Tajikistan are done by donor 
agencies and not by government agencies. Although there is no official record of all 
the WUAs set up as yet, there is without much doubt no WUA in Tajikistan that was 
established without donor involvement. The water administration itself is only in a 
limited scope engaged in WUA development. They give advice to donors on where to 
establish WUAs or they propose projects to donors. In interviews with various state 
officials, it was obvious that they do not consider reform implementation their 
predominant responsibility, but rely instead on donors to do it. The MIWM is not even 
the coordinating organization for all on-going and planned water management 
projects. There exists a department for foreign investments at the central MIWM. It 
serves as the project implementation unit for some projects. While it coordinates 
some of the bigger projects, information about all ongoing projects was unavailable at 
the central level in the Ministry nor at the Oblast branches. In the whole water 
administration, nobody seems to have an overview of where and how many WUAs 
exist. The state water administration is rather marginalized in the whole process.  
The limited role of government agencies may firstly be attributed to the lack of 
financial and human capacities to implement reforms. As mentioned earlier, the water 
sector is only financed by 10% at the moment. With the introduction of fees the RVKh 
are expected to cover part of their expenses via fee collection. As the fee collection 
rate is rather low, it can cover salaries, channel cleaning, and part of the electricity 
costs, but not substantial renovation (t31:29). The situation is especially difficult in 
those RVKh that have to operate and maintain pumping stations. This is because of 
                                            
33  Water robbery of villages or individuals at upper reaches of a river or a canal is something very 
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the maintenance costs, electricity costs and salaries. One RVKh director reported 
that they can pay only about one third of their electricity costs due to the lack of 
funds. Those constraints also make also a salary increase, which is necessary to 
attract qualified experts, impossible. 
Furthermore, the personnel capacities are limited. Tajikistan in principle has the 
opportunities for the education of specialized water experts, especially at the 
Agrarian University in Dushanbe and the TajikNIIGiM34, an applied research institute 
subordinated to the MIWM. However, the prevailing Soviet-style education is too 
specialized to meet the current needs of broadly trained experts who are able to 
include ecological or social aspects into hydro-engineering. Many qualified specialists 
have also left the state agencies. In the 1990s, many emigrated because of the civil 
war. Today, the low salary and alternative, better paid job opportunities with 
international agencies are the main reasons. The remaining personnel lack adequate 
training opportunities. Even if they have training, the above mentioned constraints 
hinder the application of new approaches: “I participate in seminars [of CFPS], but 
then I come back, and what can I do here?” (t31:6). This situations weakens 
professional culture as well as technical performance.  
 
There is still another reason for the lack of state involvement: With donors and 
international NGOs taking over tasks like the provision of water from the state, there 
is a tendency to rely on donor and NGO engagement and so to “outsource” certain 
state activities and responsibilities.   
Although state officials do not hesitate to criticize aspects of the donors’ approaches 
and WUA performance, they do not take the initiative to make their own proposals on 
how to improve the program or even take action to set up WUAs themselves. This 
lacking sense of responsibility can be witnessed not only at local level but also at the 
oblast and national levels. For example, several representatives of the MIWM 
confirmed the need for a special department at all levels of the MIWM to coordinate 
and support the activities to set up WUAs. The representatives of MIWM mentioned 
that they need specialists for mobilization, as this is not what the vodniki are trained 
for and that the donors have to be coordinated as every organization is working alone 
(t31:20-21). However, all those stated that donors should set up and finance such a 
                                                                                                                                        
common. 
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department, be it at central or at oblast level. (t39:7). There is obviously no 
perception of the option of becoming proactive and no sense of ownership of the 
process. According to reports a new ADB project started at the end of 2005 within 
which a Support Center at the OVKh in Sughd and Support Departments in two 
RVKh should be established (t31:7).  
Here one has to mention that due to the strictly hierarchical Soviet system the MIWM, 
like the other ministries, lacks experience in policy formulation and coordination. 
Vertical coordination was virtually non-existent in Soviet times (Gov. of the Republic 
of Tajikistan, UNDP 2005: 5f). Yet such a coordination is crucial for a sound 
approach to such a complex issue like water. The difficulties of coordinated action in 
land and water reform can be ascribed to this lack of experience accompanied by an 
inadequate institutional and legal framework.  
 
This limited state activity, however, is – even if indirectly - supported by the activities 
of donors. They have been eager to fill the gap left after Moscow’s withdrawal. Many 
international experts who were interviewed have been rather aware of this dilemma. 
To assess this point better, the following chapter will take a closer look at the role of 
donor agencies in the policy process. 
 
5.3.2  The role of donor agencies 
Donors play a considerable role in the policy process. They are involved in policy 
formulation as well as in implementation. They intervene at the top as well as at the 
bottom level. 
At the top level they are involved in the drafting of proposals and law discussions. 
The Law on WUA as well as article 43 of the Water Code have been mainly written 
by the CFPS, the project implementation unit of the World Bank program. It involved 
also suggestions from  Winrock International, ADB, USAID and other donors. Inputs 
from professionals of the state water agency have not been mentioned (t12:30; 
ACTED 2005: 4).  This activity is a result of the fact that the existing framework 
proved to be inadequate for the projects planned by donors. At the bottom level, they 
are implementing irrigation reform by setting up WUAs. 
                                                                                                                                        
34  Tajik Institute of Hydraulic Engineering and Land Reclamation. 
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In the CD projects, many of  the present WUAs have been initially only set up as 
informal groups to distribute humanitarian aid. One has to bear in mind that until 
some years ago, most development agencies in Tajikistan were mainly involved with 
humanitarian aid. It was only recently that the change towards long-term 
development aid began, involving questions of sustainability and legal structures. As 
most FSK still existed as large Dekhan Farms or were not transformed yet, an 
informal group as a counterpart for project implementation seemed adequate. Now 
there is a reorientation towards the establishment of long-term organizations. That is 
why many donors now want to formally register their committees, which is especially 
necessary when they collect fees or work with credit.  
 
There is a general lack of coordination among all donor agencies working in irrigation 
reform despite some recent activities to improve this (like round table meetings). This 
lack of donor coordination is a common complaint of the state water agencies, local 
NGOs and the donors themselves, at least of the smaller non-governmental donor 
organizations. One can argue that it is to a certain degree also the failure of the state 
agencies. As most donors have close contact with the Khukumat and/or Jaomat 
(district and village administration) in the regions where they work, it should be their 
responsibility to distribute this information further, e.g. to the RVKh or other 
respective agencies and to the superordinated authority.  
Some organizations contact the CFPS and get information there. However, as it 
follows a top-down approach in contrast to many local projects, it obviously does not 
serve as a model for many other agencies. As a practical guideline, some 
organizations use the booklet “How to establish a Water User Association?” prepared 
by IWMI-CA with the support of the SDC. However, the question is not only about 
practical the coordination of activities but more importantly, about conceptual 
coordination.  
 
To sum up, the intervention of donors in the policy process occurs through their 
involvement in the law making process and by establishment of WUAs. This is 
because the need for legislation for projects, and the need for counterparts to 
implement projects and to achieve sustainability. Both these activities reflect the 
donors’ interest rather than problem perception of national policy actors. They result 
in a lacking sense of ownership of the irrigation reform. 
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5.3.3  Interaction of donor and state agencies 
While state agencies play a certain role at policy formulation (together with donor 
support), their input is rarely visible in the implementation phase. Donors on their part 
intervene at top as well as bottom levels, but they neglect the meso level. Donors 
cooperate with state agencies concerning decision making processes, but with non-
state actors when it comes to implementation. The meso-level is neglected as most 
donor agencies perceive the bureaucracy as intransparent and non-democratic. 
Donor-initiated reform processes hence miss a crucial point: they are aimed at the 
national decision-making level or at the local level of the target group. This may result 
in a new law or a new WUA. However, they omit the middle level that is the link 
between the two: the level of provincial and district bureaucrats who have to 
implement reforms or circulate information. This “messy middle” (Mehta et al. 1999: 
16) is the place where formal and informal structures meet, where the weaknesses of 
the administration are more visible and more effective than on the higher levels. It is 
the provincial prosecutor who does not know how to apply a law. It is the employee of 
a local water department who accepts bribes. It is the director of the local 
administration who does not accept the WUA as an independent organization. This 
level is critical for every policy reform. Yet it is neglected in the reform process. 
 
Figure 3: Interaction between donor and state agencies 
 
The mode of donor-state interaction does not support the meso-level, and even tends 
to weaken it. It was already mentioned that many qualified experts leave the water 
administration and accept alternative job opportunities in donor agencies. Hence, 
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there exists a kind of ‘brain drain’ from the state to the donor agencies. This brain 
drain is certainly more complex than on an international level and has its positive 
effects as well: those experts still work for their country and guarantee that 
international projects include national expertise. Yet national professionals are 
seldom consigned with the development of the project but rather with its 
implementation. Additionally those projects are perceived as foreign projects and 
therefore are characterized by a lack of ownership and low feedback and learning 
effects for the state agencies. Qualified professionals working at donor agencies are 
missing at the MIWM, its branches on Oblast and Rayon level (OVKh and RVKh) and 
at WUAs. The result is not only that the state agencies that should implement reform 
lack the ownership for real commitment to the reform processes, but also lack the 
capacities. That may result in a sense of exclusion from the political processes and 
resource flows.  
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6. Will WUAs Work? 
The previous chapters demonstrated the challenge of reforming irrigation 
management. The difficulties and obstacles Tajikistan faces are partly rooted in the 
specific institutional environment of this country and partly in the characteristics of the 
political process with an extent of donor involvement typical for many developing 
countries.  
Are the described problems for irrigation reform initial and can they be surmounted? 
Or are they such an inherent part of the culture and politics in Tajikistan that they 
severely affect the possibilities for its success? This chapter will discuss the 
prospects for WUAs as the basic feature of the irrigation reform under these 
circumstances. To assess whether WUAs provide long term a promising possibility 
for local water management, I would like to focus on three critical points: WUA 
performance in water management, the financial and organizational sustainability of 
WUA and the interrelation of WUA and state structures. 
 
6.1 Water Management Tasks 
The main tasks of WUAs are the operation and maintenance of the on-farm irrigation 
system and the collection of ISF from its members. Can these tasks be fulfilled? 
The technical problems of WUAs will not be discussed here. Definitely WUAs lack the 
technical basis like tractors or aggregates. Basic equipment like water gauges to 
determine the exact water flow are also often missing. This chapter will however 
discuss if the institutional factors will impede its performance. 
The fact that patrons and elders are heading local WUAs is questionable from a 
democratic viewpoint. However that does not have to be counterproductive for water 
management. First, people tend to accept the advice of elders instead of outside 
experts. Secondly, the leading persons in a village are the former leaders of the FSK, 
be it the director, the brigadier or the leading agronomist. They know the fields and 
the irrigation system very well. Therefore it might be wise to include those who have 
the status to educate people and convince them.  
A precondition would be awareness and understanding of the purpose and meaning 
of WUA by the local leaders. All programs therefore have intensive trainings for WUA 
staff before and after the establishment. This training also includes Jaomat, 
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Khukumat and RVKh representatives. (t51:5-6). These trainings address issues like 
the setting up of a water use plan, water law, conflict resolution, etc. The impact of 
those activities is limited though. As seen in the case study, some council members 
are unaware of even their membership. At other WUAs council members or even the 
director were unsure, how much ISF the members have to pay. In one case, a 
member of a local water and health committee did not even know the exact name of 
this committee. As the same people are elected to all committees, they cannot 
provide full commitment to the special task of each committee.  
Another significant problem of WUAs is fee collection. The payment of the ISF was 
mentioned by several interviewed experts as the main problem. There is no exact 
data on the quota of actual ISF payment and oral reports vary. WUA representatives 
tend to state high payment quotas. While the MIWM estimated the general payment 
rate to be only about 30% (t07:26f), the CFPS claims a payment rate of on average 
about 60%. According to one RVKh director, there is until now no difference in the 
payment rate between WUAs and DFs without WUAs (t31:16). A considerable part of 
the fees are paid in kind (t04:25; t08:24, 35). 
Many farmers are reluctant to pay. According to the MIWM, less than 10% of the 
money is collected (6 Mio of 85 Mio somoni) (t05:75-79). Water theft is also common. 
Even when sluices are secured with locks, they are broken to let water flow to certain 
fields (t05:97). There are several reasons for this: Farmers still consider canal 
maintenance as the responsibility of the FSK (t05:75-79) In this case, reluctance to 
pay is a consequence of the lack of knowledge about land reform in general. A 
second reason is the lack of awareness about the sense and need for ISF. People do 
not understand why they have to pay now for something that was always free. The 
main reason however is general poverty: Without an agricultural sector that provides 
the means for living, payment of cost-recovering ISF and financial self-reliance of 
water user associations remain unrealistic.  
 
6.2 Sustainability  
It is difficult to give an assessment of WUAs’ sustainability in Tajikistan at such an 
early stage of implementation. As mentioned earlier, the first WUA was registered at 
the end of 2001 and therefore there is no long-term experience. Furthermore 
sustainability aspects are new for many donors, especially in CD projects. As already 
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explained, in the aftermath of the civil war most activities have focused on 
humanitarian aid with short-term results. It is only recently that a change towards 
long-term oriented development cooperation took place (t50:9). There is until now no 
experience what happens when a donor organization withdraws and the WUA is 
expected to work financially and institutionally without (at least constant) support. 
Many donors lack a clear strategy for the future of the committees (t41:6). According 
to a survey on CBOs in Sughd oblast, 80% of all Jaomat directors said that CBOs 
stopped functioning after donors left (t41:9). Will WUAs meet with the same fate? 
The sustainability of the WUAs can be questioned due to some already obvious 
factors, like the financial aspects discussed in the previous chapter. Another 
important point is ownership and community awareness. Most projects meanwhile 
include some community mobilization activities. Though many donors acknowledge 
the importance of raising awareness and a change of mentality as a basic 
prerequisite for sustainability, these components do not in general receive the 
attention they need (t41:16-17).  
Although the community-oriented programs especially strive to integrate local 
institutions and adapt to local society and culture, this happens only partially and 
instrumentally. Some Tajik feel that their country is an experimental ground for donor 
ideas, while own expertise and local knowledge is not valued (t41:19). The CD 
approach could guarantee a better embeddedness and ownership by local 
population. However, those projects are also curtailed by the tight timeframes and 
output requirements. The structure of the CBO - be it a VDC on Jaomat or Kishlak 
level, a WUA,  or an initiative group - is created rather quickly. The donor 
organization is in need for a partner in the village to implement their project. So they 
usually set up the CBO (mostly informal in the beginning) during the first few weeks 
after they start working. Real community awareness raising activities start only after 
that and through this CBO.  
Representatives of local NGOs therefore criticize that the local population is 
overloaded with the number of committees of which they are expected to be 
members:  
“If the school is renovated, a school committee is established, if medicaments are to 
be distributed, a medicament committee, if grapes are planted, a grape committee. 
For every 50 people there is some kind of committee.” (t41:14, similar: t15:22). 
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 This criticism may be exaggerated. Many donors actually stress that they are not 
establishing new committees in a village, if some kind of committee already exists 
due to other (former) donor activities (t30:35). On the other hand, villagers may 
conceal the existence of this committee because they fear that they would not get 
another project. 
 
The mentioned donor-demand for some kind of community contribution is the typical 
means to ensure identification of the local population with the project and in this way 
to ensure its sustainability. The CFPS strives to have a gradual transition to self-
financing by its annual reduction of co-financing (75%-50%-25%-0%). Most CD 
projects demand between 15 and 30%. Mostly, the villagers deliver their share in 
working time. Sometimes villagers receive food supplies (wheat or oil) in exchange 
(food for work programs). This approach reflects a learning process after the general 
failing of donors’ ‘gifts’ to communities that do not achieve ownership and therefore 
deteriorate quickly due to a lacking sense of responsibility. But one has to ask if 
voluntary work can ensure this. Furthermore those who participated in hashari are 
not always aware of the rationale of a WUA as they only participate because the Rais 
or another patron or elder demands it. A community contribution does not reflect the 
commitment of the community to the project and can be considered insufficient to 
ensure ownership.35 
Another factor is accountability. A basic feature of democratic processes in general 
as well as in WUA organization in particular is the accountability of the elected bodies 
to the people they represent. WUAs (as well as CBOs) however, feel more 
accountable to the donor organization that promoted it than to local population, i.e. its 
members. This certainly is also connected with the fact that many WUAs are 
established with the principal reason of getting access to credits and grants. After the 
disbursement stops, the motivation to work further wanes (t01a:33). One RVKh 
director describes it as follows:  
“The WUAs do only exist superficially. They have been developed top-down and do 
not function. They would have to arise due to the wish from the farmers, they 
themselves have to see the necessity. Now they only wait for the Center [CFPS] to 
give them support ” (t16:09). 
 
                                            
35  For a critical discussion of this approach in general see Bliss 2005. 
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If most farmers are unaware of the role and task of WUA, they will also not demand 
for accountability. Once again, the crucial importance of community awareness 
becomes obvious. 
Many experts therefore doubt the long term success and do not expect the WUAs to 
function long after the financial support ends (t11:10, t15:23; t50:10). 
 
 
6.3 Relation to state agencies 
Another fundamental question of WUA performance is how it positions itself towards 
state agencies. A basic idea is that WUA is not subordinated to the RVKh but acts as 
an independent organization. This requires acknowledgement of WUA by state 
agencies (RVKh, Jaomat, Khukumat) as well as transfer of resources, knowledge 
and competencies to WUA staff. 
While the relation of WUA to the DF is generally very close, it is not the case with 
local state agencies. The latter are reported to intervene in WUA affairs in a way that 
does not acknowledge its independence, thus prolonging the old system in which the 
state agencies dominated (t26:10-11). Within the water administration, WUAs are 
commonly seen as technical agencies and a means for better fee collection but not 
as empowered, self-governing farmer organizations. Such an attitude is visible in 
statements like: “WUAs are the assistants of the RVKh”36 (senior offical of oblast 
water administration; t31:8). The main incentive for state agencies to set up 
independent Water User Associations is because they lack the money to invest in the 
deteriorated infrastructure themselves (t23:24). 
As already mentioned, there is no specialized WUA law and also no clear legislation 
on the relationship between CBOs in general and governmental agencies. The 
unclear legal situation creates difficulties for the locals involved in such associations 
as they are not aware about their relation with state authorities and which rights they 
have exactly. The state agencies often also do not know about this, due to lack of 
information clear rules (t41:3-4, t30:42). Even when the WUA law is issued, it will not 
provide clear rules for all WUAs. This is already obvious now as not all WUAs as 
                                            
36  (“AVP pomoshniki Rajvodkhoza”) 
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established by donors fit into the prescriptions of the law (Winrock International 2005: 
7). 
The registration process for the WUA is often done by the donor agency which 
facilitates the process initially. However it hinders the local representatives to gain 
the knowledge and experience on how to deal with the authorities and what exactly 
their rights are. The primary contact for the WUAs with problems is not the RVKh but 
the donor agency that established them. Most donor representatives interviewed are 
aware of these problems. One foreign NGO representative concluded:  
“The greatest failing of the NGO community is not to help CBOs to understand their 
status opposite state structures.” (t30:44)  
 
When the primary partner for WUAs is the donor agency and not the state agencies 
(Jaomat, RVKh) with whom they should cooperate, the logic of patronage is further 
deepened with the donors playing the role of the patron. 
But is not only WUAs that have to be supported towards state structures. There is 
also the need to simultaneously strengthen state structures (in this case local self 
governance structures), so that they are capable of dealing with WUAs. This again 
points to the necessity to address the middle level excluded from many donor 
projects. It is only when both sides know and accept their respective roles, rights and 
responsibilities, that they can fulfill their assigned tasks in irrigation management. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to analyze the politics of irrigation reform in Tajikistan. It 
was shown that the very incentive for reform was rooted in political and economical 
transformation, especially in the reform of land tenure and agricultural production 
systems, as well as in the state budget crisis.  
Though there are laws and new regulations concerning water management, there is 
no nationally coordinated irrigation reform program, no exact legal definition about 
the status and tasks of WUAs and a plurality of actors implementing WUAs. 
Implementation in general is only realized when it is connected to donor projects. 
This can be attributed to different factors: in contrast to state agencies, donors 
dispose of (financial and material) incentives to foster implementation: New forms of 
irrigation management, namely WUAs, are only established where they are 
conditions for the access to rehabilitation grants provided by donors. Though donors 
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emphasize the need for ownership and community awareness, their activities to 
achieve these objectives are half-hearted, instrumental and ineffective.  
Besides the lack of capacities, there is also a lack of willingness on the part of the 
state agencies. This is mainly the reluctance to reform the agricultural sector and 
challenge vested interests in the cotton sector. As water reform is closely connected 
to the latter, it cannot really work. An implemented land reform is a necessary pre-
requisite to reform water management and vice versa.  
Concerning implementation, the crucial influence of societal institutions is obvious: 
WUAs cannot act independently from the hegemonic power structures. They become 
part of the system of patronage. While technical and financial aspects of WUA reform 
are adopted, others are neglected. The actual outcome of irrigation reform therefore 
differs from the intended one: it is the result of a process of bricolage in which 
different i elements derived from pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet institutions are 
put together. Such a process can lead to organizational forms adapted to local 
conditions. Yet the prospects of WUA as they exist now are not that rosy. Under the 
current conditions, success or failure of a WUA depends heavily on subjective factors 
and the situation in the respective villages. That is why continued trainings for WUAs 
and for the local population on project planning, conflict resolution and similar topics 
are important even after the financial and material input of donors stops. 
The study also showed very clearly that for effective WUA performance donors 
should strengthen not only WUAs but also their counterparts, the local and middle 
levels of state agencies. A coordination of both is substantial and has to be based 
upon clear rules and mutual recognition. When international projects exclude the 
state meso level, they do not only indirectly weaken irrigation reform but also make 
themselves part of the patronage system.  
Institutional reform of irrigation management, like all institutional change,is an 
inherent political issue as institutions define distribution of resources and allocate 
power positions to certain actors. The challenge is to alter these power structures 
and not to allow irrigation reform to be a tool for power enhancement of established 
positions. WUAs can only fulfill their tasks if the institutional conditions – in the 
economic as well as political sphere – provide them with the scope for action they 
need. 
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Annex 
 
Table 2: Details of WUAs established on the territory of Tajikistan, as far as data 
available 
Province 
(oblast) 
District  
(rayon)
Name of WUA Implementing 
agency 
Funding 
agency 
Date of 
registration 
Irrigated 
land, ha  
Number 
of DFs 
Number of 
members 
DRD Faizabad  MSDSP GTZ    858
DRD Hissor "Guliston" CFSP World 
Bank 
 1705 16  
DRD Jirgatal  MSDSP GTZ    64
DRD Kabodiyon "Habib Fozilov" WinRock USAID 22-Jul-05 454 13 6.363
DRD Kabodiyon "Shokh" WinRock USAID 26-Jul-05 925 18 10.710
DRD Rasht  MSDSP GTZ  72
DRD Rasht  MSDSP GTZ  454
DRD Rudaki "Shainaki Gado" WinRock USAID 23-Feb-05 73 11 8.973
DRD Rudaki "Majro" WinRock USAID 16-Feb-05 120 19 8.992
DRD Rudaki "Abdullojoni Sarkor" WinRock USAID 11-Feb-05 107 23 768
DRD Rudaki "Saidgalandanshoh" WinRock USAID 10-Okt-05 237 69 6.367
DRD Rudaki "Mirab" WinRock USAID 6-Okt-05 142 53 2.369
DRD Rudaki "Okchakman" WinRock USAID 7-Okt-05 177 27 1.723
DRD Rudaki "Mehtari" WinRock USAID 23-Sep-05 107 30 4.004
DRD Rudaki "Samarkandi" WinRock USAID 7-Okt-05 201 37 2.305
DRD Rudaki "Varzob" CFSP World 
Bank 
22.06.2000 997  410
DRD Rudaki "Kuktosh" CFSP World 
Bank 
 2124 340  
DRD Rudaki "Obodoni" CFSP World 
Bank 
 1662 194  
DRD Rudaki "Zaynab" CFSP World 
Bank 
    
DRD Shahrinav "Mirob" CFSP World 
Bank 
25.12.2001 1167  157
DRD Shahrinav "Navruz" CFSP World 
Bank 
 1750 9  
DRD Shahrinav "Obi toza 2003" CFSP World 
Bank 
 1730 57  
DRD Tajikobod  MSDSP GTZ    318
Khatlon A. Jomi "Sitora" ACTED EC Jan 05 3015 75  
Khatlon Baljuvon Turko GAA Baljuvon EC TACIS 2006   887
Khatlon Baljuvon Oqbuloqi Markaz GAA Baljuvon EC TACIS 2006   832
Khatlon Baljuvon Oqbuloqi Kalon GAA Baljuvon EC TACIS 2006   716
Khatlon Baljuvon Shaydon GAA Baljuvon EC TACIS 2006 80 3 1.432
Khatlon Baljuvon Boghi Zoghon GAA Baljuvon EC TACIS 2006 50 2 969
Khatlon Baljuvon  GAA Baljuvon EC TACIS  960   
Khatlon Khuroson "Mehnat" CFSP World 
Bank 
 2854 110  
Khatlon Khuroson "Farkhod" CFSP World 
Bank 
 2658 64  
Khatlon Kolkhozobad "J.Rahimov" CFSP World 
Bank 
30.08.2002 5000  300
Khatlon Kolkhozobad "Ittifoq" CFSP World 
Bank 
18.10.2002 900  250
Khatlon Kolkhozobad "Vakhsh" CFSP World 
Bank 
 5260 40  
Khatlon Kolkhozobad "Toshrobod" CFSP World 
Bank 
 3600 50  
Khatlon Shaartuz "Khoshodi" WinRock USAID 5-Okt-05 433 21 6.124
Khatlon Shaartuz "Dusti" WinRock USAID 5-Sep-05 286 18 3.662
Khatlon Shaartuz "Orzu" WinRock USAID 26-Aug-05 560 14 3.942
Khatlon Shaartuz "Aivaj" WinRock USAID 15-Sep-05 1.010 12 6.040
Khatlon Shaartuz "Tartki" WinRock USAID 4-Jul-05 274 23 12.930
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Khatlon Shaartuz  Mercy Corps   
Khatlon Vakhsh "Ibroim Karimov" ACTED EC March 05 677 19  
Khatlon Yovon "Firdawsi" CFSP World 
Bank 
10.06.2000 416  193
Khatlon Yovon "10 solagii 
Tojikiston"
CFSP World 
Bank 
15.02.2002 1072  108
Khatlon Yovon "Norin" CFSP World 
Bank 
 2010 42  
Khatlon Yovon "Chorgul" CFSP World 
Bank 
 1503 53  
Khatlon Yovon "Navkoram" CFSP World 
Bank 
 1275 43  
Sugd Ayni "Revad" GAA Ayni EC 23.11.2005  270 1850
Sugd Ayni "Vota" GAA Ayni EC 10.11.2005  270 411
Sughd Ayni "Yovon" GAA Ayni EC 23.11.2005  270 892
Sughd Ayni "Veshab" GAA Ayni EC 10.11.2005 45 270 1760
Sughd Ayni "Veshkand" GAA Ayni EC 10.11.2005 33 270 1950
Sughd Ayni "Iskodar" GAA Ayni EC 10.11.2005 105 270 1400
Sughd Ayni "Fatmev" GAA Ayni EC 16.12.2005 48 270 1252
Sughd Ayni "Zoosun" GAA Ayni EC 16.12.2005 56 270 2655
Sughd Ayni "Shavadki poyon" GAA Ayni EC     --------  270 342
Sughd Ayni "Pinyon" GAA Ayni EC 23.11.2005 4 270 502
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Dehisor" GAA Ayni EC     -------- 38 66 307
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Turo" GAA Ayni EC     -------- 26 12 62
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Vodif" GAA Ayni EC 23.11.2005 40 22 95
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Langlif" GAA Ayni EC     --------- 30 36 158
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Paldorak" GAA Ayni EC     ---------  106 732
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Padask" GAA Ayni EC 23.11.2005 24 92 525
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Dehmanora" GAA Ayni EC 10.11.2005  82 478
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Langar" GAA Ayni EC 23.11.2005 42 53 275
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Hadishahr" GAA Ayni EC 23.11.2005 180 140 792
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Pastigav" GAA Ayni EC 23.11.2005  270 1505
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Tagob" GAA Ayni EC      ---------  48 252
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Khayrobod" GAA Ayni EC 23.11.2005 41 36 200
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Mujhdif" GAA Ayni EC 23.11.2005 60 62 305
Sughd Gornaya 
Matcha
"Vardochit" GAA Ayni EC      ---------  13 51
Sughd Kanibadam "Ravot-1" ACTED EC Jan 05    
Sughd Kanibadam "Ravot-2" ACTED EC Jan 05    
Sughd Mastcha "Yokubjon 
Ashrapov"
CFSP World 
Bank 
01.08.2002 4177  600
Sughd Mastcha "Mirzo Azizov" CFSP World 
Bank 
05.10.2001 1724  1678
Sughd Mastcha "J.Odinaev" CFSP World 
Bank 
 1383 23  
Sughd Panjakent "Zargar" GAA Ayni EC 13.10.2005 14 270 1400
Sughd Panjakent "Obi Rahmat" GAA Ayni EC 13.10.2005 55 270 2500
Sughd Panjakent "Minor" GAA Ayni EC 13.10.2005 15 270 1185
Sughd Zafarobod "Kanz" CFSP World 
Bank 
15.08.2001 1699  511
Sughd Zafarobod "Sarob" CFSP World 
Bank 
 3000 105  
Sughd Zafarobod "Mehrgon" CFSP World  2200 115  
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Bank 
Sughd Zafarobod "Obron" CFSP World 
Bank 
 52947 40  
Sughd Zafarobod "S.Kenjaev" CFSP World 
Bank 
    
Sughd Zafarobod "Obshor" CFSP World 
Bank 
 2800 85  
Sughd Zafarobod "Sughd" CFSP World 
Bank 
 2500 73  
Sughd Zafarobod "Obi Hayot" CFSP World 
Bank 
 3700 235  
Sources: ACTED 2005, Annex; Winrock International 2005; MSDSP n.d. 
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List of interviews  
T01a Director of local NGO, Dushanbe, 08/25/2004 (follow-up interview) 
T02 Representative of WUA support office, Shakhriston Rayon, 10/14/2003 
T04 Two representatives of the Center for Farm Privatization Support, Dushanbe, 
10/09/2003 
T05 Vice-Minister of Irrigation and Water Management, Dushanbe, 10/09/2003 
T07 Senior official at the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Management, Dushanbe, 
10/10/2003 
T08 WUA director, Shakhriston Rayon, 10/16/2003 
T11 Representative of international donor agency, Dushanbe, 10/14/2003 
T12 Senior official of Center for Farm Privatization Support, Dushanbe, 10/13/2003 
T13 Representative of international donor agency, Dushanbe, 10/21/2003 
T14 Senior official at the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Management, Dushanbe, 
08/20/2004 
T15 Director of local NGO, Khudjand, 09/03/2004 
T16 Senior official at RVKh, Rayon Mastcha, 09/01/2004 
T19 Senior official at the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Management, Dushanbe, 
08/20/2004 
T25 Director of the Tajik Institute of Hydraulic Engineering and Land Reclamation, 
Dushanbe, 09/07/2004 
T26 Two representatives of WUA support office, Rayon Mastcha, 09/01/2004 
T27 Director, RVKh, Rayon Aini, 03/30/2004 
T28 Four members of WUA council, Iskodar, 09/29/2005 
T30 Representative of international NGO, Khudjand, 10/03/2005 
T31 Senior official of Oblast water administration, Khudjand, 10/11/2005 
T32 Senior official of the National Land Committee, Dushanbe, 11/01/2005 
T34 Representative of international NGO, Dushanbe, 10/31/2005 
T35 Senior official of international NGO, Khudjand, 10/06/2005 
T36 Community development specialist, international NGO, Khudjand, 10/06/2005 
T38 Two representatives, local CBO, Farkhor Rayon, 10/19/2005 
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T39 Senior official at the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Management, Dushanbe, 
10/28/2005 
T41 Representative of local NGO, Kudjand, 10/07/2005 
T42 Director of Mahalla committee, Iskodar, 09/30/2005 
T43 Representative of National Land Committee, Aini, 10/01/2005 
T44 Community development specialist, GAA, Aini, 09/29/2005 
T45 Farmers, Iskodar, 09/29/2005 
T46 Farmers, Iskodar, 09/28/2005 
T47 Agricultural specialist, GAA, Aini, 09/29/2005 
T48 WUA development specialist, GAA, Aini, 09/27/2005 
T48a WUA development specialist, GAA, Aini, 09/28/2005 (follow-up interview) 
T49 WUA director, Iskodar, 09/27/2005 
T50 Deputy regional director, international donor agency, 10/04/2005 
T51 WUA development specialist, international NGO, Khudjand, 10/03/2005 
 58
Literature 
ACTED 2006: Memo. Minutes from the 3rd meeting on Water Users Associations. 23 
December 2005. Dushanbe (unpublished). 
ACTED 2005: Memo. Minutes from the meeting on Water Users Associations. 20 
October 2005. Dushanbe (unpublished). 
Action Against Hunger (AAH) 2003: Land Reform in Tajikistan. From the Capital to 
the Cotton Fields. Dushanbe (unpublished). 
Bierschenk, Thomas; Chauveau, Jean-Pierre; Olivier de Sadan, Jean-Pierre 2002: 
Local development brokers in Africa. The rise of a new social category. IFAS 
Working Papers No. 13. Mainz. 
Bliss, Frank 2005: When poverty reduction causes yet more poverty. In: 
Development and Cooperation No. 12, (www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-
eng/12-2005/tribune_art1.html). 
Bucknell, Julia et al. 2003: Irrigation in Central Asia. Social, Economic and 
Environmental Considerations. Washington (World Bank). 
Chhotray, Vasudha 2004: The Negation of Politics in Participatory Development 
Projects, Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh. In: Development and Change (35) 2: 327-
352. 
Cleaver, Frances 2002: Reinventing Institutions: Bricolage and the Social 
Embeddedness of Natural Resource Management. In: The European Journal 
of Development Research (14) 2: 11-30. 
Farm Privatization Support Project 2001: Reccomendation on Establishing Water 
User Assoiciation in Tajick Republic. Dushanbe (unpublished).37 
GAA 2006: Protokol No. 4. 27 January 2006. Dushanbe (unpublished).  
Gosudarstvennyi komitet respubliki tadzhikistan po zemeustrojctvu 2004 : Svod 
zakonov i drugie normativno-pravovye akty o zemle. Dushanbe: Sarparast 
2004. 
Government of the Republic of Tajikistan; UNDP 2005: Sustainable Water Use and 
Management in Tajikistan, n.p. 
Grundmann, Silke 2004: Decision making in the rural Mahalla. Zervshan Valley, 
Northern Tajikistan. (unpublished). 
                                            
37 Incorrect spelling in original document. 
 59
Ilolov, Mamadsho; Khudoiyev, Mirodasen 2001: Local government in Tajikistan. In: 
Munteanu, Igor (ed.): Developing New Rules in the Old Environment. Local 
governments in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. 
Budapest: Open Society Institute, p. 603-648. 
International Crisis Group (ICG) 2005: The Curse of Cotton. Central Asia’s 
Destructive Monoculture. Asia Report No. 93. Bishkek, Brussels. 
IWMI-CA 2003: How to Establish a Water Users Association? Tashkent. 
Mehta, Lyla et al. 1999: Exploring Understandings of Institutions and Uncertainty: 
New Directions in Natural Resource Management (IDS Discussion Paper 372) 
. Brighton. 
Mercy Corps n.d.: Concept Paper: Partnership Public Awareness Pilot Project. 
(unpublished). 
Mollinga, Peter; Bolding, Alex 2004: Introduction. In: Mollinga, Peter; Bolding, Alex 
(eds.): The Politics of Irrigation Reform. Aldershot: 1-10. 
Mott MacDonald; Department for International Development (DFID) 2003: 
Privatisation/Transfer of Irrigation Management in Central Asia. Final Report. 
December 2003 (CD Rom). 
Mott MacDonald; DFID 2005: Equity, Irrigation and Poverty. How to distribute water 
to the poor. Summary report (Draft). N.p. 
MSDSP n.d.: Ruykhati. N.p. (unpublished). 
Narain, Vishal 2004: Brackets and black boxes: research on water users’ 
associations. In: Water Policy 6: 185-196. 
Platteau, Jean Philippe 2004: Monitoring Elite Capture in Community-Driven 
Development. In: Development and Change 35 (2): 223-246. 
Roy, Olivier 2000: The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations. London, New 
York. 
Sehring, Jenniver 2005: Water User Associations (WUAs) in Kyrgyzstan. A Case 
Study on Institutional Reform in Local Irrigation Management. (ZEU 
Discussion Paper No. 24). Giessen. 
UNDP 2003: Tapping the potential. Improving water management in Tajikistan. 
Dushanbe. 
UNECE 2004: Environmental Performance Reviews. Tajikistan. New York, Geneva. 
USAID/ARD 2004: Land Reform and Farm Reorganization in Tajikistan. Policy Issues 
Paper. (unpublished). 
 60
USAID n.d.: Irrigation Improvements in Tajikistan. An Overview of USAID Activities in 
Central Asia. N.p. 
Winrock International 2005: Memo. Minutes of the Meeting on Water Users 
Association. 25 November 2005. Dushanbe (unpublished). 
World Bank 2005: Project Information Document  (PID), Ferghana  Valley Water 
Resources Management Project (Report No. AB1425). Washington. 
World Bank 2004: Project Information Document (PID), Community Agriculture and 
Watershed Management (Report No. AB111). Washington. 
World Bank 2004: Project Information Document (PID), Second Farm Privatization 
Support Project (Report No. AB1167). Washington D.C. 
 61
Acknowledgements 
My thanks certainly go to all my interview partners who took the time to answer my 
questions and were willing to share their thoughts and experiences with me. Due to 
the need for confidentiality, I unfortunately cannot thank them by name.  
I am especially grateful to Anja Ikbendanz and Donyor Ibodov of GAA Aini office as 
well as Frank Paepke and Sofia Azizova of GAA Khudjand office. They not only 
supported my research logistically and allowed me to look into their work but also 
enriched my considerations with their willingness to critically reflect their own work. 
Special thanks go also to my field assistant Antonina Abdurazakova. For the financial 
funding, I thank the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). All views 
expressed are, of course, my own. 
 
 62
Bisherige Veröffentlichungen in dieser Reihe: 
No. 1 HERRMANN, R., KRAMB, M. C., MÖNNICH, Ch. (12.2000): Tariff Rate Quotas 
and the Economic Impacts of Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the WTO. 
(etwas revidierte Fassung erschienen in: "International Advances in Economic 
Research", Vol. 7 (2001), Nr. 1, S. 1-19.) 
No. 2 BOHNET, A., SCHRATZENSTALLER, M. (01.2001): Der Einfluss der Globalisie-
rung auf staatliche Handlungsspielräume und die Zielverwirklichungsmöglich-
keiten gesellschaftlicher Gruppen.  
 (erschienen in: "List-Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik", Bd. 27(2001), 
H. 1, S. 1-21.) 
No. 3 KRAMB, M. C. (03.2001): Die Entscheidungen des "Dispute Settlement"-
Verfahrens der WTO im Hormonstreit zwischen der EU und den USA – Impli-
kationen für den zukünftigen Umgang mit dem SPS-Abkommen. 
(überarbeitete Fassung erschienen in: "Agrarwirtschaft", Jg. 50, H. 3,  
S. 153-157.) 
No. 4 CHEN, J., GEMMER, M., TONG, J., KING, L., METZLER, M. (08.2001): Visualisa-
tion of Historical Flood and Drought Information (1100-1940) for the Middle 
Reaches of the Yangtze River Valley, P.R. China.  
 (erschienen in: Wu et al. (eds) Flood Defence '2002, Beijing, New York 2002, 
pp. 802-808.) 
No. 5 SCHROETER, Ch. (11.2001): Consumer Attitudes towards Food Safety Risks 
Associated with Meat Processing. 
(geänderte und gekürzte Fassung ist erschienen unter Christiane SCHROETER, 
Karen P. PENNER, John A. FOX unter dem Titel "Consumer Perceptions of 
Three Food Safety Interventions Related to Meat Processing" in "Dairy, Food 
and Environmental Sanitation", Vol. 21, No. 7, S. 570-581.) 
No. 6 MÖNNICH, Ch. (12.2001): Zollkontingente im Agrarsektor: Wie viel Liberalisie-
rungsfortschritt? Ergebnisse und Diskussion einer Auswertung der EU-Daten.  
(gekürzte Fassung erschienen in BROCKMEIER, M., ISERMEYER, F., von CRA-
MON-TAUBADEL, S. (Hrsg.), Liberalisierung des Weltagrarhandels - Strategien 
und Konsequenzen. "Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.", Bd. 37(2002), S. 51-59.) 
No. 7 RUBIOLO, M. (01.2002): EU and Latin America: Biregionalism in a Globalizing 
World? 
No. 8 GAST, M. (02.2002): Zollkontingente bei US-amerikanischen Käseimporten.  
(gekürzte Fassung erschienen in: "Agrarwirtschaft", Jg. 51, H. 4, S. 192-202.) 
No. 9 BISCHOFF, I. (08.2002): Efficiency-enhancing Effects of Private and Collective 
Enterprises in Transitional China. 
 63
No. 10 KÖTSCHAU, K. M., PAWLOWSKI, I., SCHMITZ, P. M. (01.2003): Die Policy Ana-
lysis Matrix (PAM) als Instrument zur Messung von Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und 
Politikeinfluss - Zwischen Theorie und Praxis: Das Fallbeispiel einer ukraini-
schen Molkerei. 
No. 11 HERRMANN, R., MÖSER A. (06.2003): Price Variability or Rigidity in the Food-
retailing Sector? Theoretical Analysis and Evidence from German Scanner 
Data. 
No. 12 TROUCHINE, A. (07.2003): Trinkwasserversorgung und Armut in Kasachstan: 
Aktueller Zustand und Wechselwirkungen. 
No. 13 WANG, R.; GIESE, E.; GAO, Q. (08.2003): Seespiegelschwankungen  
des Bosten-Sees (VR China). 
No. 14 BECKER, S.; GEMMER, M.; JIANG, T.; KE, CH.. (08.2003):  
20th Century Precipitation Trends in the Yangtze River Catchment. 
No. 15 GEMMER, M.; BECKER, S.; JIANG, T (11. 2003): 
Detection and Visualisation of Climate Trends in China. 
No. 16 MÖNNICH, Ch. (12.2003): 
Tariff Rate Quotas: Does Administration Matter? 
No. 17 GIESE, E.; MOßIG. I. (03.2004) 
Klimawandel in Zentralasien 
No. 18 GIESE, E.; SEHRING, J. TROUCHINE, A. (05.2004) 
Zwischenstaatliche Wassernutzungskonflikte in Zentralasien 
No. 19 DIKICH, A. N. (09.2004) 
Gletscherwasserressourcen der Issyk-Kul-Region (Kirgistan), ihr 
gegenwärtiger und zukünftiger Zustand 
No. 20 CHRISTIANSEN, TH.; SCHÖNER, U. (11.2004) 
Irrigation Areas and Irrigation Water Consumption in the Upper Ili Catchment, 
NW-China 
No. 21 NARIMANIDZE, E. et al. (04.2005) 
Bergbaubedingte Schwermetallbelastungen von Böden und Nutzpflanzen in 
einem Bewässerungsgebiet südlich von Tiflis/Georgien - Ausmaß, 
ökologische Bedeutung, Sanierungsstrategien 
No. 22 ROMANOVSKIJ, V.V.; KUZ’MIČENOK, V.A. (06.2005) 
Ursachen und Auswirkungen der Seespiegelschwankungen des Issyk-Kul’ in 
jüngerer Zeit 
No. 23 ZITZMANN, K.; TROUCHINE, A. (07.2005) 
Die Landwirtschaft Zentralasiens im Transformationsprozess 
 64
No. 24 SEHRING, J. (08.2005) 
Water User Associations (WUAs) in Kyrgyzstan -  
A Case Study on Institutional Reform in Local Irrigation Management 
No. 25 GIESE, E., MAMATKANOV, D. M. und WANG, R. (08.2005) 
Wasserressourcen und Wassernutzung im Flussbecken des Tarim (Autonome 
Region Xinjiang / VR China) 
No. 26 MOSSIG, I., RYBSKY, D. (08.2005) 
Die Erwärmung bodennaher Luftschichten in Zentralasien. Zur Problematik 
der Bestimmung von Trends und Langzeitkorrelationen 
No. 27 GAST, M.: (09.2005) 
Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment of OECD Countries 1991-2001 
No. 28 GIESE, E., TROUCHINE, A. (01.2006) 
Aktuelle Probleme der Energiewirtschaft und Energiepolitik in Zentralasien 
No. 29 SEHRING, J. (06.2006) 
The Politics of Irrigation Reform in Tajikistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stand 20. Juni 2006 
Die Diskussionsbeiträge können im Internet unter:  
http://www.uni-giessen.de/zeu/Publikation.html eingesehen werden. 
 
 
